

(Amour) - 3 pages - Confidence.

Marriage - 1 p.

AMOUR
MARIAGE

1. Qu'est que l'amour? L'amour est "le premier acte de l'appétit" : la proportion par laquelle un être est proportionné, mis en complaisance avec le bien.
Il se distingue du désir, qui est une tendance ^{en}vers le bien aimé; et de la délectation qui le repose dans le bien possédé. L'amour est la racine de tous les mouvements de l'appétit: on ne désire qu'un bien aimé; on ne se délecte ou ne se réjouit que d'un bien aimé.

2. Ainsi défini, l'amour se retrouve en toutes choses, ~~matérielles~~ en Dieu, et en toute créature, donc même dans les choses inanimées.

- Il y a amour en Dieu, Il s'aime, et il aime les créatures qui procèdent de son amour.

- Dans les créatures: toutes ont une fin, et la fin n'est autre chose que le bien "perfectum per modum appetitus." Même les choses matérielles sont pleines d'"amour naturel" (amor naturalis) pour la perfection qui leur convient selon leur nature.

3. L'amour est tantôt simplement amour, tantôt dilection, tantôt charité.

- On tient pour "cher" un bien de grande valeur. L'amour divin est appelé charité: deux charités est.

- La dilection a pour objet un bien choisi - "delectio" de "electio". Elle se trouve aussi dans l'être raisonnable. Dans l'amitié, p. 4.

- L'amour, terme génér. employé pour l'espèce: est, chez les animaux une passion - le premier mot de l'appétit concupiscible -; et, chez les plantes et les choses inanimées, appétit naturel.

4. Quel primo bien pour nous? primo appétit? primo amour?

- Qd omnia appetunt. Premièrement dans le toucher et le goût.
Extension des termes.

- Amour: latin 1°: "Sentiment d'affection d'un être pour l'autre. Epris d'amour. Prié d'amour... lettre d'amour. Un amour violent aux raisons ne s'accorde. (Régner)". Le 3° sens est celui de l'affection profonde, comme "l'amour des parents pour leurs enfants."
chez les animaux

Pourquoi l'autre vient-il en premier? Parce que les délectations du toucher sont les plus véhémentes. II II 141, a. 4, c. - "delectationes venerum sunt vehementiores quam delectationes ciborum" 155, 2, 4^m.

5. Quid: "tanto aliqua delectationes sunt vehementiores, quanto consequuntur operationes magis naturales"?

Parmi toutes les œuvres de la nature, la génération est la plus naturelle - et "magis divinum": "Omnia illud appetunt, et illius causa agunt omnia, quaecumque agunt secundum naturam." (Arist.)

C'est pour servir cette œuvre, dit St. Thomas, que les ~~deux~~ plaisirs du manger et de la chair sont naturellement si forts.

Attention H/poi: l'animal cherche 1° le plaisir. C'est la nature qui cherche le bien de la conservation et de la propagation.

C'est la véhémence des plaisirs de la chair d'une part, et de l'autre part, déséquilibre entre la raison et la chair ~~et~~ la suite des péchés originels, qui font de cette délectation quelque chose de tronqué, et qu'on appelle "fomes peccati". + Cela ne rend pas les délectations de la chair de soi ~~excessives~~ illicites, mais cela les rend moins nobles. Dans l'état d'innocence, la virginité n'aurait pas été meilleure que le mariage; mais dans la condition actuelle de l'humanité, elle l'est de beaucoup. C'est l'enseignement constant de l'Eglise. Cette distinction n'a rien de "puritain". Humilité. Pourquoi grande délicatesse avec les enfants.

6. Revenons à la considération purement naturelle.

Quel est le principe naturel de cet amour? St. Thomas, dans les deux dernières questions de la Ia Pars, qui terminent le traité du genre, décrit par les causes secondes: (a) l'homme a sa part dans le gouvernement du monde (a) par l'enseignement, (b) la transformation de la matière corporelle (c), la propagation de l'espèce, (d) la nutrition. - La grandeur de cette œuvre éclate dans la joie de la mère à la naissance de son enfant.

7. La cause première de la différence des sexes.

Pourquoi cette différence des sexes? Envisagée au point de la seule nature, elle a sa raison dans l'intelligence humaine. A mesure que les animaux irraisonnables sont plus proches de l'homme, la différence des sexes, et de leurs vies, est de plus en plus marquée. C'est la femme qui porte le fardeau de l'œuvre de génération. La femme est par là plus proche de la nature - et comprend naturellement beaucoup de choses que l'homme ne comprend pas.

8. Jusqu'où va cette différence ? Simplement dans le corps ?

Non, elle affecte très profondément la substance toute entière et l'âme des personnes humaines — faisant de l'homme et de la femme des êtres qui se complètent dans tous les ordres de la vie humaine, et même dans l'ordre surnaturel.

- Dans l'ordre naturel : la famille : les différentes espèces d'amours qui sont fondées sur la génération.

Amitié aristocratique entre l'homme et femme.

L'amour maternel, etc.

Si l'ordre de génération est fondement de toutes ces relations humaines, il n'en est pas le terme.

Ici, nous dépassons de très loin l'amour-passion — nous entrons dans l'ordre de la dilection.

9. Au pdr. surnaturel :

L'union de l'homme et de la femme est consacrée par un sacrement — qui est le symbole de l'union entre le Christ et son Eglise, et même de l'âme bienheureuse à Dieu.

La nature devient fondement d'un ordre dans la charité.

L'indissolubilité naturelle du mariage devient objet de foi surnaturelle.

L'amour passion n'est pas le lien propre des époux.
(Ceci très important pour la question du divorce).

10. Les caractéristiques des sexes ont été portées très haut et dominent en qq sorte la création toute entière. Le X est un homme et la V. une femme. Expression importante : la charité de celle-ci pour nous prend une forme féminine. Elle est virg, mère, Reine.

Que si dans l'ordre naturel la femme porte le fardeau de la génération — et que ses besoins sont souvent plus humbles que celles de l'homme — il ne faut pas oublier que cette femme qui est au-dessus de toutes les autres, pure créature : une mère véritable — et qui est l'original de toutes les mères chrétiennes. L'homme qui ne comprend pas la femme ne peut pas non plus comprendre cette femme Reine du Sacerdoce. C'est d'ailleurs à Elle que s'attaquent les régressions d'un certain féminisme — ennemi de la nature autant que de la grâce.

Marriage

"Ordo amoris" in wedlock.

"Amor-naturalis" } in concupiscibili.
 } ut: Pleasure.

Senses of "nature" (as opposed to senses of knowledge):
ordered to } conservation of individual: *factus* *exterior*.
 } propagation of species. } *factus*.

Pleasure, *bona*, "*necessitas vitae*". Satisfaction moving
functional and transitory. Would forget to eat. No infirmity.

"Generatio, *opus naturalissimum & magis divinum*":

fecundity & permanence. Common good of species: *bona*,
pleasure attaching to... the most vehement. *know good & evil*

In fact, so vehement, that because of relative continuity
between flesh & spirit (due to trig. sex) it comprises
experience of "*formis peccati*". cf. II, 48, a. 2, 3m

Since virginity more perfect, and it is the only reason.
[Sometimes, cause of disagreement. *humility*. *sanity*.] *Not for food or drink.*

"*Duo in carne una*": Mt. 19: 3-6. Other than our children.

2. Amor dilectio (electio, will): } not contrary to sense, } gone infinite.
 } but not sense alone }
 } in rational part of soul. } Already gone divine: God chooses "to love".

3. Amor caritatis:

Quid caritas? Not just sentiment. Theol. virtue: God as
in Himself. Inseparable from love of neighbour.

"*Caritas caritatis*":

- God (& humanity of Christ f.B. Virgini) } cf. II 124
- Self }
- Neighbour: 1st wife. Mt 19: 3-6. More like self than anyone else.

The wedded are God's choice. He chooses those who are to
be loved by us in charity, in a special way. Rule
of chance - instrument of divine Providence.

Marriage Sacrament

Signifies union of Christ Church. (hypostatic union)
Essence of marriage: "*indivisi-bilis unitio carnis*"
Fidelity to union. Testimony of Christ's faithfulness to Church.
Not enough to say "I am in this". Must instruct.

1° *Utrum in deo sit amor.* I^a 20. (Tract. de deo uno)

2° *Utrum deus sit causa finalis omnium.* I^a 44, a. 4. (de Creatione)

3° *Utrum omnia immediate gubernentur a deo.* I^a 103, a. 6 (de gubernatione
eorum).

4° Les deux derniers qq. de ce traité et de la I^a pass. portent sur
l'immutation et le gouvernement des créatures par l'homme.
L'homme participe à ce gouvernement:

- par l'enseignement;
- par la transformation de la matière corporelle;
- par la propagation; (l'espèce)
- par la nutrition. (l'individu)

5° Parmi les œuvres de la nature, la propagation est de l'espèce
et à la fois l'œuvre la plus naturelle et "magis diuinum".
"Omnia illud appetunt, et illius causa agunt omnia,
quocumque agunt, secundum naturam."

6° Propagation et sexualité.

I, Q.98, A.X, a.2, ad 3: "Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. By immoderately I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of mind. Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust.

ST. JOHN'S SEMINARY
Camarillo, California

Vincentian Fathers

"Nor is this reasoning traversed by the fact of some particular woman having wealth and power enough to nourish her offspring all by herself: for in human acts the line of natural rectitude is not drawn to suit the accidental variety of the individual, but the properties common to the whole species." Cf. III 123.

"Although indissoluble belongs to the second intention of ~~marriage~~ marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, it belongs to its first intention as a sacrament of the Church. III. Syst. 67, 2, 3rd.

Sublime. sim. sum. cogn. Eph 5. 22-32.

Indissol. Mt. 19. 3-9.

Diem au Fidelien

Les aïes.

Quid on m't corbeu même par des
jeunes on pense "Quelle folie"
"c'est pas naturel de se souvenir m't
~~mais de se souvenir de~~
qui on pensait la m' chose et
quel âge.

Les conflits des diffes. génération et
naturel. Associés à l'âge. Pour
de jeunesse et senectute.

Ns ne ne attendons pas à ce que les
enfants naissent en marchant et
en parlant. Et on veut que nous
voulons traiter les adoléscent, que
ms m'ns amuse, comme des
adultes.

...

Michelin

dans la biographie
On dirait que les hommes
ont toujours éprouvé ~~des~~
la une difficulté à reconnaître
qu'une personne passe par
des âges avec différents,
l'enfance, l'adolescence,
la maturité, la vieillesse.
La raison en est qu'on n'a
jamais à la fois dans
l'un et l'autre de ces âges.
Ce sont toujours les jeunes et
les vieillards qui manipulent
de compréhension les uns
vers les autres - entre
qu'il y ait une mesure
d'incapacité, surtout
au plan moral, dans n'importe
quel âge.

C'est souvent la couardise des
adultes qui fait la force des
impuissants.

Avicenna..... mais un individu sans
formation, ou dont le Q.I. est trop bas
pour être accepté dans une faculté ~~et~~
autre que celle de la philosophie
peut lire la métaph. d' Aristote
au cours d'une fin de semaine pour
la juger de très haut et la rejeter.
Qui mieux ~~et~~, ^{on peut aisément} ~~et plus souvent on~~
la condamne sur la foi d'autrui
^{con de l'ignorance}
qui ne l'a pas lue non plus.

Les adolescents qui passent
incrédiment à la sénilité -
c'est-à-dire à l'indolence
[à l'insouciance, c'est-à-dire à la
sénilité.

Le problème des jeunes

L'adoption en deuxième lecture du projet de loi prévoyant l'institution d'un Conseil Supérieur de la Famille a fourni, au début de la semaine, l'occasion au premier ministre et à des membres de l'Opposition de manifester leur inquiétude sur le troublant problème que pose l'évolution de la jeunesse québécoise.

M. Lesage pour sa part a déclaré qu'on ne bâtira rien dans la révolte, dans la critique et dans le manque de respect à l'autorité. Il venait auparavant de dire qu'il n'existe pas plus triste spectacle que de voir l'émancipation dangereuse de la jeunesse et son esprit de liberté, qui devient du libertinage, gagner même nos campagnes. Il a par la suite ajouté que tout ce que nous pourrions faire pour aider la famille à garder dans son giron les enfants de tout âge, que tout ce que nous pourrions faire pour que les enfants respectent leurs parents et l'autorité de Dieu à travers celle de leurs parents, de leurs maîtres, sera bon pour la société.

Sa déclaration a rejoint les préoccupations de tous ceux qui s'inquiètent du problème des jeunes et de la famille. Il ne fait aucun doute que la jeunesse d'aujourd'hui est en rupture ouverte avec ses aînés et qu'elle ne respecte guère aucune forme de discipline qu'on cherche à lui imposer. Il ne fait aussi aucun doute que la famille, une des plus riches valeurs morales du milieu québécois, a perdu beaucoup pour ne pas dire pratiquement tout du sens qu'elle avait, il y a encore une génération, et que ses liens s'affaiblissent d'un jour à l'autre. Il ne fait aucun doute qu'il faut trouver un moyen de corriger une situation qui risque de nous conduire à l'anarchie la plus complète.

Le problème n'est pas seulement québécois. Il est canadien et nord-américain, même européen. Il nous apparaît peut-être pire parce que la rupture avec le passé s'est, dans notre milieu, opérée plus rapidement et plus brutalement qu'ailleurs. On pourrait épiloguer longtemps sur les causes de ce phénomène. Elles sont multiples et si les unes sont d'ordre moral, de nombreuses autres sont la conséquence de la transformation du milieu social au sein duquel nous évoluons. Ils est

nes, quand en réalité, ce ne sont pas eux les véritables responsables. Ils sont arrivés dans un monde qu'ils n'ont pas contribué à édifier, un monde bâti par leurs aînés qui n'étaient pas préparés aux bouleversements dont ils ont été témoins et victimes.

Les jeunes héritent de la situation que nous leur avons faite et de notre incapacité de nous adapter au nouveau climat social né d'une très grande prospérité matérielle, de l'industrialisation à outrance, de l'urbanisation, et de l'expansion fantastique des moyens de communication et de diffusion. Le rythme trépidant de la vie moderne a entraîné chez l'individu un certain déséquilibre psychique et la recherche des biens matériels a affaibli quand elle n'a pas totalement détruit le sens des valeurs.

La jeunesse dans son ensemble est ce que, individuellement ou collectivement, nous l'avons faite. Inutile de nier nos responsabilités. Elles nous accablent. Reconnaissons-les franchement et efforçons-nous d'opérer le redressement qui s'impose en ne cherchant pas à rétablir le passé, mais en nous inspirant du plus sain réalisme. La jeunesse d'aujourd'hui est et sera différente de celle des époques passées. Elle offre d'immenses possibilités, mais à condition qu'on soit à la hauteur de la tâche, qu'on l'aborde avec la générosité, l'ouverture d'esprit qu'elle s'attend à trouver chez les aînés. Le sens de l'autorité, tel qu'il existait jadis, est à jamais dépassé. Il est impératif de revaloriser les notions de liberté et d'autorité, de les redéfinir en tenant compte du contexte actuel. Les parents doivent par leur conduite inspirer non seulement l'amour, mais le respect de leurs enfants. Les maîtres doivent s'imposer, non seulement parce qu'ils sont détenteurs de l'autorité, mais parce qu'ils sont capables et dignes de l'exercer.

Inutile de songer à enrayer ce mouvement d'émancipation des jeunes sans d'abord procéder à une réforme des aînés, à une réforme des individus et de la société toute entière. Il faudra pour cela beaucoup plus qu'un Conseil Supérieur de la Famille. Il faudra, sans tomber dans un rigorisme exagéré, éliminer tous les éléments qui sapent à leur base les valeurs morales sur lesquelles repose une saine phi-

Pour le Canada Français.

To be or not to be.

Contre Q. Maurois dans *Élection Cathol.* Mardi 5 ou 12 VII sur la mort.
des PP Rédemptoristes ont raison dans leurs exemples du désespoir, sens du néant.
Ils n'ont pas en disant que la mort n'est rien (négarion double) qu'on sent la vie.
de néant: on négie on lui: on en fait un néant dialectique. Le néant (p. ex.
la négation de l'immortalité) est la négation de la Société. Et pourtant la Société
moderne n'en sent pas. Elle met son espoir dans le néant.

cf. lettre à Adler.

cf. Versin de force.

En deuil de la vie, la mort est le grand problème.

de longues et savantes dissertations ont été écrites sur Hamlet. Et pourtant
c'est une chose si simple: un homme qui a le sens de l'être dans une
société qui ne l'a pas. Shakespeare parle au représentant de la mythol.

C'est ce qui rend difficile le Molinisme qui tire l'être dans le néant.
Le monde moderne met son espoir dans le néant.

Ce que l'on veut depuis des siècles c'est la liberté vis-à-vis l'être, vis-à-vis
la raison ou du bien. On veut se hausser au-dessus de l'être: c'est
là toute la dialectique transcendantale.

Être avoué veut dire aujourd'hui avoir réussi à penser sans se référer, ni explicitement
ni implicitement aux premiers principes.

"This saying is hard"

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Myth. Fidei: concern of wine

Quid perfectio of faith?

Ascend to divinum qua div. on basis of God's
own knowledge.

Perfectio of Faith: circa divinitatem & humanitatem

Ideo Ascension.

Incarnation duo: Godhead & humanity.

It's humanity must become object of their
faith: Not only belief in what is
reported; not belief in Resurrection:
but belief in presence amongst us in
what is sensible, tangible.

God's method of concealment in Eucharist:
Nourishment: it's not just a static, deluded
presence.

What, in the Euchar. contributes to concealment?

A sensible reality: a food.

But the kind of food:

- purely natural

- product of human industry.

Purely natural: ratio indita ab arte div.

Bread & wine: ratio ab arte nostra et
tamen divina.

Threepled logos.

Logos speaks
in perfect silence.

Our faith has the
first and last word

diff. with respect to knowability.

Chosen something relatively clear.

Hence greater contrast between divine
word and our own.

MARIE

- Schémas de coufer.

- Le dogme de la présence de Marie 2 pp. $8\frac{1}{2} \times 11$
- " " " 1 p. $8\frac{1}{2} \times 11$
- Assomption - 1 p. $8\frac{1}{2} \times 11$
- Assomption - 1 p. $5\frac{1}{2} \times 8\frac{1}{2}$
- Dogma of Mary's presence - 2 pp. $6\frac{1}{4} \times 8\frac{1}{2}$
- (A.A.) 1 p. $7 \times 8\frac{1}{4}$
- (A.A.) 1 p. $8\frac{1}{2} \times 11$

Le dogme de la présence de Marie

1. Pourquoi cette proclamation solennelle de l'Assomption comme dogme de foi?

Remarque souvent émise: Tous ~~se~~ croyaient déjà. On en était certain.

~~Il y avait~~ Faut-il comprendre qu'avant la récente définition, l'Assompt.
n'était pas certaine?

Il y a quatre degrés de certitude, et ils diffèrent ^{entre eux} d'une manière radicale:

- la certitude purement naturelle: p. ex.: de ce qu'il est impossible d'être
et de n'être pas en m. temps et sous le même rapport; de ce que j'existe.
C'est la certitude qui est au principe de toute la philos.

- A l'autre extrémité il y a la certitude de foi divine ou théologique: la
certitude que nous avons des vérités que Dieu même nous a dites.

Très Sts Mystères: l'Incarnation, la Maternité divine, l'Immaculée conception.

- Les vérités que nous croyons de foi divine peuvent servir de principes, ^{non dérivées}
d'où, par voie de raisonnement, nous pouvons inférer des conclusions,
c'est-à-dire des vérités qui sont virtuellement contenues dans les vérités divines.
La certitude de ces conclusions est très grande en raison du principe ~~non~~
formellement évident; mais elle est diminuée ~~par rapport à~~ ^{en} comparaison de celui-ci. En effet, nous ~~sommes~~ ^{ne sommes} certains
de ces conclusions, non pas ~~parce~~ ^{parce que} elles sont des vérités que Dieu même
nous a dites, mais ~~parce~~ ^{parce que} nous les avons bien inférées en appliquant
correctement les règles de la logique. Cette certitude est ~~très~~ ^{très} incompara-
blement plus grande que celle que nous avons appelée purement naturelle.

Elle est surmountable
en raison de son
principe.

- Il y a enfin la certitude de la foi ecclésiastique. C'est la certitude
qui vient de l'Eglise en vertu des promesses du X de demeurer
avec Elle jusqu'à la fin des temps. Dès que le bien commun de
l'Eglise est engagé, ~~l'enseignement~~ ^{son enseignement} son enseignement ou
matière de foi et mœurs est certain au moins de la certitude
infaillible de la foi de l'Eglise. ~~C'est le cas des Encycliques~~
~~et~~ des doctrines théologiques approuvées et proposées par l'Eglise.
Tout ce que le Magistère ordinaire propose est au moins de foi
ecclésiastique.

L'Assompt. de la TS Vierge était, avant sa déclaration solennelle, certaine
au moins de foi ecclésiastique. Grâce à la promulgation du dogme, nous savons
maintenant que l'Assomption est une vérité divine, formellement évidente;
et nous la croyons parce que c'est Dieu même qui l'a dite. Il y a là
une différence infinie.

- 2
2. Opportunité de la définition.
Elle est exprimée dans la Cont. Apost. (1485 a)
3. Pourquoi "piété plus grande". Quid piété?
Pourquoi cette piété est-elle si importante? Médiation universelle - certaine de l'infailibilité de l'Eglise. La V. est principe universel pour nous.
Grâce à ce dogme nous savons d'une certitude proprement divine que ce principe est bien parfait : qu'il est entier : que la personne elle-même de la P.V. est là et que c'est elle, même qui intercede pour nous. - Pourquoi le P. Père parle-t-il du "cœur immaculé", du "cœur makmel"?
4. Cette doctrine de la prière de Marie, nous la retrouvons tout le long de la Constitution Apostolique. Voici, en effet, un texte très explicite, qui est une citation de S. Bonaventure. (1482-3 a) Donc, tous les attributs de la personne...
Même à cet égard il y a donc une très grande différence entre la P.V. et les autres saints - disons plutôt et les âmes bienheureuses des autres saints.
En effet, les autres...
Mais pourquoi invoquons-nous tous les saints dans leur personne?
5. La P. Père avait déjà cité un passage de S. Jean Damascène ^(8^{es}) que la citation de S. Bonaventure permet de mieux comprendre. (1479 b)
Manifestement, pour que ce texte puisse se rapporter à l'Assomption, il faut l'entendre au sens fort : les noms de la V. tiennent de sa personne physique - et non pas simplement d'une représentation mentale.
6. La perfection du Fils:
(a) La piété: { 1480 f
1483 g
1484 h
(b) Les relations entre la mère et le Fils. Fils à l'image de sa mère.
Texte de S. Bernardin. 1483 c
7. La personne de Marie et son action dans le présent: c'est la V. elle-même que nous invoquons et qui intercede pour nous. C'est grâce à l'Assomption, à l'existence présente de sa personne qu'elle peut dire à Jésus: "Mon fils", le "cœur immaculé" et "makmel", ~~donc chose~~ ^{donc chose} ~~cette~~ ^{cette} et physique.

Le dogme de la présence de la Sainte Vierge

1. Pourquoi une proclam. solenn. de l'Assomp. comme dogme de foi?
2. La certitude: naturelle; théol.; foi ecclésiastique, i.e. théol. de l'Eglise; divine.
3. Opportunité: générale: Cf. Grignon de Montfort, p. 33-35.
particulière: (a) 1485 Dieu veut que la gloire très parf. de la V. soit connue très particul.
des maintenant comme objet de foi.
4. Pourquoi piété plus grande? et l'à-propos du cœur immaculé? et du cœur maternel?
Voir Texte de S. Jean Damascène (8^{es} s.) (b) 1479. Qui est "celle"? Ne serait-elle
pas dans les diuinités, etc.?
Autre Texte: "A toi de très glorieux Mère..." (c) 1480
5. S. Bonaventure. (d) 1482-3.
Il en est ainsi pour tous les attributs qui reviennent seulement
à la personne de la Vierge: la Vierge, la Mère, la fille, la Reine, etc.
6. Pourquoi invoquons-nous les autres saints dans leurs personnes? Trois raisons.
Donc très grande diff. à cet égard. Il y a très parfait proportionnement
de la S. Vierge à notre condition présente. Elle est maintenant parfait présent.
Elle est maintenant principe universel dans la complétude de son être.
7. S. Bernardin de Sienne: (e) 1483.
Les relations entre la nature humaine du X. et la Vierge.
Fils à l'image de sa Mère. Relations de similitude et
d'origine ne seraient pas vraies du présent.
La Mère de Dieu ne serait pas avec son Fils, la personne ne serait pas...
La femme ne serait pas réunie: le modèle des Vierge et des Mères n'aurait pas
d'existence dans le présent.
8. La piété du Fils.
Quid piété?
(f) 1480: "Jésus-Christ à cause de sa piété à l'égard de sa
Mère, a voulu l'élever au ciel".
Texte de S. Francis de Sales? (g) 1483
Raisonnement du S. Père: (h) 1484
9. La personne de Marie et son action dans le présent: Elle intervient pour nous,
et non pas est son âme; c'est la vierge, la mère, la reine, la fille de Dieu,
la nouvelle Eve, et non pas est son âme.
10. "Il faut espérer... que tous les fidèles seront portés à une piété plus grande
envers leur céleste Mère." Comment? Le cœur immaculé, le cœur
maternel. Pas chose du passé, ni est pour la fin des temps. Ce ne sont
pas simplement des métaphores. Choses plus physiques et réelles que celle que
~~le Triomphe du X. et parfait pour le triomphe, dans la Mère.~~
nous percevons ici par le sens.

Nous faisons maintenant toutes ces choses — et nous pourrions
en déduire beaucoup d'autres — en vertu d'un principe que
nous tenons désormais expérimentalement d'une certitude proprement
divine. Permettez-moi de terminer ce commentaire par la
lecture de la lettre de ce principe dont la connaissance très
explicite est le grand privilège de notre temps — ~~ce qui~~ si honnête
par ailleurs. Voici, en effet, les paroles mêmes de la définition
du dogme de l'Assomption :

... qu'on ne peut pas dire que l'âme humaine est immortelle, mais qu'elle est éternelle.

... et que l'âme humaine est éternelle, mais qu'elle est immortelle.

7

8

9

... et que l'âme humaine est éternelle, mais qu'elle est immortelle.

Assomption

1. Pourquoi cette définition?

Parce que ce fait pas certain?

Tous y croyaient. Pourquoi donc promulgation d'un dogme?

2. Les quatre degrés de certitude.

Naturelle... 4

Foi théologique. 1

Théologique. 2

Foi de l'Eglise. 3

3. L'Assomption était déjà certaine de foi de l'Eglise. Maintenant...

Si Dieu a voulu nous révéler cette vérité, elle doit être divinement inspirée.

Si " " nous la faire proposer par l'Egl. comme telle, i.e. comme dogme de foi, sa confession par tous doit être obligatoire pour tous les temps.

4. Opportunité.

Grande souffrance, épreuves de la vie.

Piété envers Marie, au plus en, croît chaque jour davantage.

(a) C'est Marie qui remplit admirablement ses fonctions de Mère: nous sommes incités avec plus de soin ses privilèges.

D'abord Imm. Concup. - d'où, pas sujette à la corruption du tombeau.

A la fin de la Contid.: "Nous avons une entière confiance... notre propre résurrection, et la rendra plus active." (1485-6)

Mais, pourquoi tout cela s'il a la fois un terme et un principe d'une plus grande piété?

5. Pourquoi une "piété plus grande"?

Quid "piété"?

Or, Marie, dans sa compassion rédemptrice, ~~et~~ nous a enfanté spirit.

Médiane - tout bien sumat par elle. Donc, très grande piété envers elle.

Or, cette maternité spirit. est fondée sur sa maternité physique de Dieu.

Pie XII parlait du "cœur maternel". La Mère de Dieu, qui

s'aime nous-même, et là, comme mère.

Le principe de notre vie spirituelle est là dans sa son intégrité.

Assompt.

1. S. Mt. 22.23. - "sublimissime et efficaciter".

2. Anima Petri non est Petrus.

3e Rati.

3. B. Virgo. Sa Raison. Mère. Vierge.

Ts les noms de la personne. "Quam..."

S. Bonav. (p. 238) . S. Jean Damasc. (232)

4. "Spem, quam Pater desponsaverat..."

Christus in Imago -> eadem Persona. les relations.

5. Pietas. 4e command.

Prophétie

Haec in diebus...


Realité complète. dépendance réciproque.

"Tous ces arguments..." 243. (241)

6. Maternité spirituelle finie sur mat. ph.

Éaps mystique. (245)

7. Salve, Regina, Mater misericordie.



COLLEGE DE SAINT-ANNE DE LA POCA TIÈRE

Dogma of Mary's presence

1. Why this solemn definition?
Belief already common. Was Ass. uncertain?
Resp.: Four kinds of certitude radically different.
Assumpt. was already certain "de fide Ecclesiae".
2. Timeliness:
Hingling of joy with our sorrows: this has meaning only
for those who understand what the B.V. herself means to the Church.
Not just to know that it is so, but to know this with divine certitude.
- Principle of progress in knowledge of truth & Faith: divine mercy manifest
more & more. Mary as work of div. mercy. Greater need,
greater help. "Actually, God..." ①
- Disposition peculiar to our time. ②
- What is to be expected from this definition, for our time? ③
- Divine assertion of the reality of the whole man, in the face
of nihilistic idealism and materialism. ④
3. Why "stronger piety"? What connection?
What is piety?
The virtue by which we honor, render a cult to, the principles
of our being - parents, ancestors, God.
Now, Mary, mediating, gave spiritual birth to us in her
compassion with Christ. This spiritual maternity is
based on her physical maternity of God.
It is this mother who is the object of our piety, - for,
Mary, come now, "shows her motherly heart to
the members of the mystical body."
Why does this present maternity, this present care by the
Mother herself, presuppose the present reality of the Assumption?
Because the Assumption is an essential condition of
the truth that the Mother of God, that the B.V., exists:
otherwise our piety would go to the means of the mother,
or, in the present, only to the soul, to part of the mother,
not to the mother herself, not to that principle
of our being, in its complete being of principle.

4. Dogma of Mary's presence:

- Quot. from St. Bonav.

Diff. between Mary & the other Blessed. - Why invoke them in person?

- John Hymense.

Mother, Virgin, Spouse, Handmaid, names of person.

5. Assumption is work of pious Son.

6. Reality of Mother-Son relations.

7. Piety: principle now complete in power and glory:

This mother can say: "My Son"! The "incomprehensible heart"; "maternal heart" now physical elevation.

The solemnity and the gravity of this belief...

1. Why the definition? Attitude of divine Faith. Meritorious act of Faith.
2. Time: (a) Sorrows - joy. For those who understand what B.V. means to the Church.
 (b) Pietas → know more. ("Now, just like...")
 (c) Progress of manifestation. Assumption privilege of our own age. (Actually fact...)
 (d) Reason for "stronger piety". ("It is to be hoped..." p. 34a)
 (e) Strictly divine assertion of reality and relevance of the whole man, in the face of nihilistic idealism and materialism.
3. Why "stronger piety"? What connection between "Assumption" & "piety".
 Quid piety?
 Assumption as work of piety of Son. (p. 32)
 Effect of this a "stronger piety" towards Mary.
4. Why piety at all?
 Because "spiritual mother" - part of Christ. Mediation.
5. Why should divine attitude of Assumption increase it?
 Spiritual motherhood of Mary based on physical motherhood of God.
 " " " " is to have truth in present, then physical motherhood too.
 Precisely, unless Mary now exists as mother, the spiritual motherhood itself has no foundation in present.
6. Thanks to the Assumption, we can say, with div. cert., that the mother of God exists; that she herself is now there. That the principle of our spiritual life now has its complete being. This principle now enjoys its fullness of person.
7. The dogma of Mary's presence.
 St. Bavenhure.
 differ. from other Blessed.
 St. John Damascene.
8. Reality of Mother-Son relations.
 St. Bernardina of Siena. - "My Son".
9. Piety: very concrete
 Immaculate Heart.
 Maternal Heart.
10. Solemnity of declaration. For, now, without it, no Faith at all.

Pius XII inserts several times on the virtue of piety in connection with the Assumption:

- Piety of faithful: better knowledge, request Church to throw greater light on truth of Assumption.
- Assumption work of piety of the Son.
- "should incite to greater piety."

Quid pietas? "Honore thy father and thy mother": ^{principles pointing} Primus Patris.

God demands honour towards created principles of our being in IVth commandment
Duty so great that our Lord predicts us one of the greatest calamities the impiety of
the sons who will turn against their parents, whether parents good or not.

Birth of Son from Eternal Father: Image, return. Purely intellectual procession.

Procession of all the we can make and do, make represented by Word.

First: Son of man and mother: Son to be born and this initiates here eternal
procession from Father.

Dependence, therefore duty of piety towards Mother.

From the height of the Cross: does not leave Mother alone — John.

It gives most perfect example of piety towards ^{generating} principle of his birth as man.

Unity of generating principle { eternal process: Father.
temporal " : Mary: resemblance.

Immediate generating principle undivided, unique. Piety undivided: "Honore thy father

Temporal generation: dependence upon a corporeal being.

- Body essential to Mary as a human person and as a Mother. (a)

- Person, Mother, object of X's piety.

"She is truly the Mother of X" (P. 12)

Immaculate Mother: perfect integrity.

Piety of Son & Assumption: p. 32

Piety for her compassion: sorrowful because of motherhood. This, in turn,

fruitful compassion: spiritual motherhood towards us. It becomes
His Mother because of this co-redemption.

Immaculate Conception makes this compassion more perfect.
deserves glory. Person of Mary interests for us: "My Son".

Thanks to Assumption perfection X's temporal filiation complete. "Assimilation". (b)

We can then know the Person of Mary, given piety towards complete principle of
our spiritual filiation. It is there now. (c)

This cause for greater piety. (d)

- Elys à ordre surm. connu de auge.
- luvion d'apost.
- native angélique.
- nat. infér., lum.
- invaid: { c'est, d'après origène d'
Pigmalide, d'ém.
- nat. nat. { (Néob, just, fmes)
- Anomphie de parité et parade par
pêche. Pour d'ém. à l'ém.
dans le N.
- Marie d'ém. au f. d'ém. parité.
Plus parité avec parité à parité.
- d'ém. nat. d'ém. → parité.
- Anomphie, et "reditio ad principium",
par parité du f. d'ém.
d'ém., cycle parité { parité, fmes.

Certitudo 4x

Pietas 3ter.

2x generatio.

Ide cum dependentia: 4th commandth.

Instruction from Cross.

Compare unity of generatio principle. Undivided.

What the mother? Person obj. of piety of Son.

: Maria immaculate Mother.

: Role in Redemption. "My Son".

Circulatio.

She there now. Reason for greater piety.

"... Pietas dicitur cultus qui deo exhibetur, tamquam summo parenti..." In ad Rom. (p. 20 + 4)

* Pietas est, per quam parentibus patriaeque benevolentiae officium impendimus, sicut religio, per quam cultum debitum deo exhibemus. Pietas enim importat quamdam affectionem ad suum principium. Principium autem generationis est pater et patria. Et ideo oportet quod homo circa eos sit benivolus. Pater autem omnium est deus. I ad Tim. p. 209a.

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Memo enim ~~corpus~~ carnem suam odio habuit. Eph. 5. 29.
Génération Israël. est Peu; Gén. temp. est mœre, huicité du
prinçipe génération maintenant.

Elle garde avec nous des bon personnels.

Le Chris a voulu qu'elle puisse dire, maintenant, "mon Fils".

Un seul principe générateur de la procession temporelle.

le seul principe géniteur de la processionnelle est le Père.

" " " " " " " Lemprolla e' s'f la Mir.

Similitude sans mélange, indivise.

Voir "Corporis Mystici" fin.

Pas simple allusions, mais pleine vérité.

THE COLLEGE OF ST. CATHERINE

ST. PAUL 16, MINNESOTA

Mysterium Fidei

*Perfectionism: contra bonum comm spirit
hinc Ecclesiae.*

Hinc. Distig.

No wonder so diff. Hiddens per excellentes.

Even aversion. Unden drawn by the Father.

"A qui irons. nous?"

Design to conceal.

*Why bread and wine instead of apples
and milk. Nature obscure; artificers x known.*

*Quid panis? Duplex Verbum { natura
artefactum*

*In sacramento ipsum Verbum
sub specie panis, man
gratia vigo. dūm in
obscuritate.*

Hic latet ac humanitas.

*Pro. comm. { Sumus nūc sumus mille
Quantum isti et ille.*

*Touch hypostatic order. Ipsum Verbum qua
incarnatum.*

College of St. Thomas
St. Thomas Military Academy
St. Paul I, Minnesota

Stress "communio".

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

rational, i.e.
responsible
agent.

Dignity of person; image, but *person* responsible.

Close to "cause", "αἰτία".

Norm of behaviour within each person: conscience
(aliquid idem quod lex naturalis).

This the basis of citizenship: *causa sui*.

Because must recognize everyone duty to obey
conscience - peace possible, so long as
behaviour not obviously contrary to
common good.

Religious problem of "Tolerance". Bad word.

Quid "freedom of religion"? Quid "freedom
of conscience"? Two distinct things, even
when correctly understood.

1° Freedom of conscience not freedom to have
no conscience, or of acting against it.

2° Of religion, more difficult. Just as we
cannot do violence to conscience by
pressing someone to believe against his
own conscience. (right or wrong), we cannot
force someone to embrace a given religion.
Thus, contrary to dignity of person and to
the dignity of the object of religion.

Also: obj. truth and the way we come to know it.

Philosophy of Dress

The Beard of St. Joseph

Evolution

Why St. Thomas?

Our Awesome Creed

Christian Benignity

(St. Victor)

(St. Joseph)

Scientia boni et mali (mêmes feuilles)
chance and fortune

(Faith to Liberty, Religion)

(Faith and Religious Freedom)

(St. Thomas today)

(The Human Condition) 5pt.

(Philosophy and Science) 4pt.

1-2 mai 1963

Philosophy of Dress

Background of 10th category. (Catechism's second intentions - remote, fancied...)
This category (def. "that which results from being clothed"),
typically human.

Man, born most helpless of animals. Professor Carter.

But in lieu of this, man is provided with reason and hands.

Relation between infirmity of reason and hands and mouth
as organ of speech. Mouth of the beast determined.
No articulate speech - Though much communication.
"Lingua" free and absolute.

Infirmity in hands. Evolution of weaponry.

Clothing: complementum artis: homo arte et ratione vivit.

I Protection. Ubiquity

II Social reasons.

(a) in beasts - Darwin's Origin of Species.

(b) in man. - External appearance.

Infirmity of words and circumstances. Body itself monstrous, too determined and West. dig gone.

Morning, afternoon, evening.

Social rank. But disappearing - except in army, and where equality, maternal, most

explicitly paraded. [In Church too. Liturgy;

Religion, orders: Symbol of the particular
spiritualities - stability of detachment.

Circumdata varietate. Judge people by their apparel.
Not enough, but. Ties.

III Understanding.

(a) objectivity. Touch all over - unequally. Tickling.
Where, thanks to resistance of clothing.

(b) Separation from nature. As in housing; so in
clothing. Expression of man's relative transcendence
with respect to nature. Spiritual quality of house

IV Adoratio vera. Christi. Animae. P. V. ...

The Beard of St Joseph

Leo XIII: After Mary, Joseph closest to Christ.

Who is St Joseph?

True husband of Mary. true bedrock:

(1) essence: *unio animorum*.

(2) purpose: child: common good.

{ generation — } cultivation
{ nourishment — }
{ education — }

II^o Person in dependence of Joseph:
woman --- protection.

Holy family's common good supreme.

Child: stability: here most stable

Society - out of which grows
the Church.

St Thomas makes much of two points:

{ Name of Jesus - Joseph representative of
Father

nam^o Richard { Nourishment: *Quae humanis* ...

Special relation of Joseph to Eternal Father
of whom no mission.

Image du Père éternel. *Olier*

Father hidden, God present in Joseph

(primitive paintings of Nat. & Epiphany).

St Luke, ...

Evolution

(Rita)

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I The usual, and impossible way of looking at nature.

Not a sup. mode
of expression:
inanimate
unanimous

Inanimate world: phys. chem.

Animal world: biology

Rational animal: psychol.

Order of inferior to superior
reality.

Understood as superposition.

There is such an order, but not of extreme superposition.

Why not see it as an order of execution?

Execution of what? Of some purpose. What does purpose

involve? Good; not just direction. It is good for the dignified

This not seen in material physics.

"Good" is the key to the problem: organisms.

to have this. He would be
helpless; or with the Wingman

And we are moved by a purpose. House, for instance. All that is needed
and all that happens in between is for ^{the} sake of habitation. Why should nature
not proceed the same way?

Houses do not come from the lower. First, the idea. Houses do

not build themselves. Does nature alone produce the ends. But let this

The anthropomorphic conception we have of God. He has given what

nature needs, as nature, to fulfill purposes. He is not a being by machines

Nature is not a puppet show.

The fact that God moves my will does not prevent my willing from
being mine ^{own} or, this being cause of myself, from being myself.

Quodlibet of our nature given. But not without its
being a work of nature. If so, no nature.

II

Organ: to be for the sake of something. This recognized as a good.
Does the good have nature of cause? (i.e. responsible for...)

Various types of causality. Ex. house { habitation
material
structure
making

Notice: habitation first & last.

First as an idea: present ideally, first in intention
Last in execution.

We observe and say that animals and their parts come from nature.

The purpose of organisms inferior to man far from obvious.

[Surely not just for food and transportation].

Evolution is the only theory that comes close to an explanation.

More and more heterogeneous organisms did come about
in the course of time; and eventually ended in man.

There were many deviations leading to dead ends, such
as overspecialization. But man did come about.

Is the idea of direction enough? Purpose implies more
than that: only: that for the sake of which all this
is going on.

Where is the purpose before it is executed, realized?

Quomodo in nature, inasmuch as nature is "ratio indita..."

But man without intellect, which alone can account for
the intention that not as yet existing reality presupposes. But
no puppet show!

The intellectual form of man not material, yet requires a subject.

Not immediately created. Yet not at all as angels. Requires an
organized subject. This gradually.

First subject, prime matter, capacity for every form. Appetite, natural.

Appetite by reason of "similitudo appetitus". The greatest for the
higher form. This disposition difficult to achieve. Confident
to nature, labor. This causality cannot be compared to
nature, which is marvellous, without subjecting nature to
the vicissitudes that we observe in the world here below

Have life in the rocks.

It remains true that "Qualitatis genus nativum..."

But this ~~abstract~~ intellig. is no substitute for nature.

What the experimental biologist observes is nature's share
in the production of man.

~~The true perspective is not~~

Two perspectives

} the order of generation.

} the order of purpose or point in intention.

Why St Thomas?

- ① Take phil? all by itself.
Diff.: 41 to 9: 60 pages.
Note History of phil.
Extrad. continuity of questions.
Contrasting & development of phil.
dependence on Martin, more than elsewhere.
Purpose: 1° speculative.
- ② Such being the case, to whom shall the young
engineer go? St random? Adverse.
- ③ In Church, need for phil.
cf. Ia, p. 1, a. 1; 9.5, ad 2.
Which philosophy?
Here, precept by author.
Not contrast.?
- ④ Downgrading S.Th.:
Exposed. pure modern doctrine - not
per full flow of thought.
Can't stop what we can not begin.
Lobby on index.

A propos Martin: Aristotle & S. Th. examples of docility.

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③ How to understand the need for philo. in the Church.
(contin.) Which philosophy?

Not indiff., else Latin Moricism.

Not indiff. which phil. Who can advise us?

Can the authority of the Church be about philo.

Contrad. { in philo. "locus autoritatis" ... infirmus.
appar. { ex. Ia, p. 1, a. 8, ad. 2.

Pourtant, la faiblesse de notre raison nous met
dans le besoin de la philo. Mais laquelle philosophie?

D'après le Magistère, les principes de la méthode de S. Th.
sont très purs. Elle est, l'Egl., dit "St. ad Thomam!"

Pas question de prendre la philo. dont se sert S. Th.

comme un objet de foi mais, comme un instrument
que l'on doit connaître pour savoir s'en servir.

Quel risque y a-t-il à entreprendre cette étude?

Ne nous empêchera pas d'étudier les autres.

Même m. de com. celles de notre époque, comme
S. Th. a connu celles de la Sicile.

Pour conclure Hegel, pour S. Thomas.

de m. que la philo. de S. Th. a sans valeur

pour celui qui n'a pas la foi, si ancilla donc

se sert la théologie et inutile à elle sans foi.

But this philosophy is extremely obfisc. in most.

Becomes more
diff. with pressures
of the day. No
leisure.

le qui nous amène à la question: Should there
be a downgrading of S. Th. ? and of Scholastic
method?

Dist. { We cannot abandon what we have never known.
Text-books give little or no idea. Yet because some
necessary because so many have to acquire some
understand of what is theol.
As to method: question of terminology. Injurious
of much. But should refer to...
Else technical. Easy to use words whose
meaning not known.

Name things as we know them. Our texts are littered with words such as "essence" & "substance", existence, suppositum, etc. What do they mean? A vast number of things...

As to method.

Scholasticism is a method of conveying knowledge
"per modum doctrinae..." Facing difficulties.

Originally Aristotle. - Not just a man of thought.

We, full of answers, disclaiming ignorance & doubt
question put to us we respond jamais possible. Ex. tempore.

sol. { Burn all our textbooks.
S. Th. on index.

Instead of considering auth. as an imposition,
should thank God for his guidance. Christ constituted
the Magisterium of the Church. "Who heareth
you heareth me."

Our Awesome Creed

I. The natural transcendence of God.

1. The difficulty of knowing Him by unaided reason.

- (a) The natural unpreparedness of the human mind; the natural need for rectification. The unlikelihood of PAIDEIA.
- (b) The contingencies which the acquisition of natural wisdom is subject to.
- (c) The present plight of natural wisdom. The historical fact and its common consequences.

2. What we can know of God by reason.

- (a) The way of causality. The cause is named after the effect. Infinite disproportion. Never tells us what God is.
- (b) The way of negation. The presuppositions of negation. The need to multiply negations.
- (c) The negation of negation. Never brings us face to face with God as He is in Himself.

3. Evil, and contingency; their transcendence.

- (a) Death, the inevitable evil. The darkness of what lies beyond death. Neither Plato nor Aristotle tried to probe the beyond.
- (b) The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.
- (c) History without a plan. Its natural and moral irrationality. Like "a tale told by an idiot, full... signifying nothing." The argument "There is evil, therefore God exists", however true, does not bring the human heart to rest.

II. The transcendence of the human person with respect to nature.

- (a) The human condition is liable to obscure the dignity of the person. His physical and moral destructibility. Emergence of our knowledge in the course of history, and at the same time a growing negation of the person's dignity in the name of dignity.
- (b) Unworthy conduct supposes some norm of worth. The cause of "malum ut in pluribus in specie humana" remains obscure though partly accounted for by priority of sense.
- (c) A person cannot be forced to accept even natural truths which he, individually, cannot grasp.

- (c, suite) Even natural faith requires free consent.
Both the dignity and frailty of the human person must be respected. Man's nature remains a paradox.

III. God's transcendence in the History of Philosophy.

1. The earliest phusikoi. Even Anaxagoras's was deus ex machina. Anaximander.
2. Socrates's God was concerned with the individual. The Theos of Aristotle was utterly transcendent. The way he speaks of God shows both respect for Hellenic religion and awareness of our inadequacy. God alone is wise and wisdom; the good in virtue of which all else is good.
3. St. Paul did not condemn the Greeks for their cult of the "unknown God", but tells them what this unknown God has done and planned for us.
4. In the Middle Ages theologians became aware how much the early Fathers and Doctors of the Church had in fact used philosophy for the purpose of manuductio.
5. It is in later ages, especially with Hegel, that philosophy swallowed Faith and Theology. Since then, philosophy downgraded, in a more or less sophisticated way not only the awesomeness of the "unknown God", but what is more appalling, the God known to Himself. The more the word transcendence is used the emptier. The word, like "being", has ~~many~~ vulgar overtones.
5. Even the natural transcendence of God is underestimated. The reason is that the extraordinary difficulty of natural wisdom has become unknown. Perhaps because it is believed to be all there in our textbooks, neatly printed and boldly underscored, full of pat answers to ~~many~~ problems, that have not been raised. Such philosophy as combustible as the printed page.

III. The Supernatural Transcendence of God.

- 1.

3e bonum proles; de m, triplex bonum

matrimonii { esse
nuptiarum
disciplina sine educatione.

des parents participent davantage à la

paternité de Dieu d'après en procurant
le 3e bien qu'on procure les 2 premiers.

Très important pour nos mrs.

C'est m la façon la plus profonde de

participer au gouvernement divin.

Dieu s'incorpore créateur
" de gouvernement, Dieu } immortel
} Médiateur:
sans cesse.

dans le travail de gouvernement par ceaux

subordonnées, parus les anges: par
illumination. Vie paternelle: dépense

quant à la emm, la vie spirituelle. l'impératif.

Secundo, les hommes. Paternité active:

le plus grand bien ad xps.

Premier effet inter. de la charité:

la paternité (secors à ceux dans
le besoin). Paternité des ceux

de nos siècle: docce ignorants.

paternité de ceux qui nous instruisent,
l'interphore?

Ad. Ephes. 3/15: "C'est pourquoi je
fléchis les genoux en présence du Père
de qui toute paternité, au ciel et
sur terre, tire son nom."

Comm.: ordre de dénomination pour 7 ans
part du plus connu de us. Mais ads
verum inverse.

Le cas de prêtres qui enseignent. Mon spm.
de 30 ans.

Rep. de S. Thomas. (Qd. I, a. 14) Exceptionnel
épiscopi et doctores....

Opin. sur Corinthes: oculi corporis

Mystici. La main qui instruit....

Vérités divines. Mais les autres? Instruire
avec sagesse. Respect des diff. Nations

Paternelle ou paternité diff. à m
comme toute chose spirituelle. Pourtant.

Soyez parfaits de m que votre Père celestiel
est parfait. (Matth. 5/48)

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Christian Benignity

Cardinal Lercaro, the Archbishop of Bologna, explained recently in a lecture on religious tolerance, highly praised and repeatedly quoted by our own Cardinal Leger, that the very dignity of faith is utterly incompatible with ~~a lack of respect toward the freedom of the person, i.e. with~~ the negation of the freedom of conscience. || In other words, it would be contrary to the dignity of faith to force anyone to adopt it. This implies among other that a political community which would exact, as a condition of citizenship, the adoption of the Christian faith or of any other religious belief, stands condemned by the teaching of our Church.

None the less, the temptation to use all possible means, irrespective of individual conscience, to bring everyone to our own faith proves often too strong. This is so true that St Gregory the Great warned: "If, moved by right intention, you desire to bring to the true faith those who do not belong to the Christian religion, you must use persuasion, not violence. Otherwise, they who would readily be enlightened by your words will be driven away by ^{your} hostility;

Fides est
{ Actus } a nobis
{ obj. } a veritate

Quasi
infirmum
fidei est
a nobis,
ut Palagiani.

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all they who, on pretext of wishing to tear away men from the cult of their religious traditions, behave differently, thereby show that they seek to fulfill their own will rather than the will of God." Gregory IX applied this doctrine when he said that "Christians must behave towards Jews with the same benignity they would desire in favour of Christians who live in Pagan countries". Whatever may have been the practice in Catholic countries through the ages, it remains, as Innocent IV declared, "contrary to the Christian religion, that a man be forced, without ever having willed it, and notwithstanding his unconditional opposition, to become or to remain a Christian."

shows attitude
in place

Having argued from these and other texts, Cardinal Mercaro does not hesitate to deplore the fact that "the medieval Inquisition persecuted the freedom of consciences and that, after the Reformation, representatives of the Catholic Church would often go so far as to praise the principles of the Counter Reformation, even when they implied recourse to violence." The Cardinal also states that "the literal meaning of a considerable number of expressions employed by Gregory XVI and Pius IX is ostensibly contrary to religious freedom." At the same time he ~~allows~~^{notes} that ~~a~~^{an} close scrutiny ~~of~~^{these} their texts "do~~es~~ not convey the impression that they put the emphasis on the distinction to be made between tolerance in matters

where
place

to
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of religious doctrine and civil tolerance, but rather on complete intransigence in the theoretical field, to the point of misleading Catholics to exclude any spontaneous recognition of freedom for those who think differently."

It should be plain to any Catholic today that no one should be forced to adopt the Christian faith against his will. Yet one might ask whether an analogous freedom is to be respected with regard to certain natural truths, even basic ~~immortal~~ ones, e. g. the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the teachings about the grounds, in themselves quite necessary, of the moral life. The question is, in other words, can civil society compel its members, directly or indirectly, to profess publicly the existence of God, the Supreme Judge, or of the natural law in the terms in which we formulate that law?

Or again, can we not at least allow the political community to impose upon its people what is sometimes called a 'natural religion'? But this would ^{in practice} ~~mean that~~ Caesar ~~is invested~~ with power to declare what that religion is. *The fact that Caesar does not do so, not mind*

^{saw God face to face}
If we ~~knew the truths of faith by intuition~~ we would not have the theological virtue of faith; it would be impossible not to give assent to ^{divine truth} ~~those truths~~. On the other hand, are the most basic, natural truths so obvious that no one can be ignorant of them without being insincere? To hold such a position one would have to ignore the history of philosophy at any period.

Cause of it and call it original sin, but simply because the Church tells me that this is so.

No one can prove to me that mankind has been redeemed from this fault. Besides, I shall never understand in this life why we should bear punishment for a sin committed by another person. However, once I know this from faith that comes through hearing, I can see reasons which make the transmission of evil more understandable, but the measure of understanding depends upon my accepting by faith something that I do not understand. Whatever understanding I reach, my Faith is never dependent upon that understanding.

The history of modern thought, which began in the late Middle Ages, is not in every respect as deplorable as some would have it. Not that it is to be praised for the skepticism and agnosticism to which ^{it has led} a considerable number of modern intellectuals ~~have been led~~. ^{Neither} ~~but now~~ can we pay homage to the arrogant pessimism of the laudatores temporis acti. Christian doctrine is basically optimistic: we must humbly but firmly believe, I think, against ^{all} manicheans of every variety, that God would not permit the enormity of evil if ~~he~~ could not somehow turn it to the good. Surely the deviations of modern thought, outside the realm of science, are to be considered in that light. Oportet haereses esse: indeed not in the sense that we should devise them, but because they ought to be used as an occasion for more diligent study and further manifestation of ^{the truths} ~~what~~ they contradict. They serve as reminders of what sleepy minds we have, which are rarely quickened ^{by clearer understanding and defence of truth} save by thrust of error. The fact that the world should have moved so far away from God becomes, in such a perspective, one more indication of his ^{glorious} transcendence. ~~and~~ of our own lowliness, and of his ^{unfathomable} ~~disregard~~ ^{disregard} for us.

The last four centuries have made us more sensitive to the difficulty of knowing in a rational way even the most basic among natural truths, ^{such} as those just mentioned. The human condition being what it is, strictly rational knowledge of that kind has ^{is} ~~become~~ for most people practically impossible. We must remember that ^{White} ~~great~~ ^{some} teachers in the Church have proposed

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This fact had
come obscured
in St. Thomas.
See TAPAS, p. 1,
2. 15, 29 ~~III~~ I, 4.

④

as demonstrative, ^{rational} proof for the existence of God, what, according to saint Thomas, proves nothing at all. Who would claim that a man only acquires, say, civil rights the day he is rationally convinced of truths without which man, as well as civil society, would theoretically be absurd? Such a claim would but betray ignorance of the way in which man accedes to the knowledge of fundamental truths even of the natural order. Most of us hold these because from childhood we have been persuaded by the authority of our parents and ^{i.e., by our parents and other teachers delegated, implicitly or explicitly, by their biology} teachers. This is as it should be. It only goes to show in fact how important the education of our children is, by example and by word, even long before the so-called age of reason.

Yet even when in later life, ^{basic natural truths} ~~such truths~~ are held by faith in the ^{human} authority of those we trust, since the assent is not caused by evidence, free will has still its role to play. Compulsion here would again prove contrary both to the dignity of the truths in question and to the freedom of the human person. Christian understanding, Christian benignity, ^{therefore} must extend even to agnostics -- a rule quite independent of the question whether an agnostic can actually be ^{such in} ~~more~~ more than ~~the~~ words. ^{we can declare} There is hardly need to wait for an answer before ~~declaring~~ ^{from reason} openly that the civil community has no right to force my fellow citizen to say things he does not believe, or at least thinks he does not. If we do not have the right to impose by coercion that which is most true, it is because our neighbour has a

* "Letter from Valhalla City", New York, Oct 20th, '62, p. 95 et seq.

If my experience is of any worth we must subscribe to this observation. The attitude reported in this article is a most unhealthy one.

Yet it is understandable: the familiarity of our beliefs may owe something to the fact that we have learnt them from childhood. The things which are often repeated become so ingrained that we come to think they are self-evident, or at least so obvious that we behave towards others as if only ^{obtuseness, dulness of mind or even} ill-will could prevent them from joining us in our creed.

To indulge this attitude is a sure sign that we do not know our own faith; that we have watered it down to our ^{thoughtless} ~~own~~ propositions.

Yet the basic truths we hold by divine faith are humanly incredible. They are so far beyond the grasp of our minds, and in themselves so excellent, that the first effect of faith is fear, servile fear of what is in store for us if, having the faith, we do not hold fast to it and do what we should.

Servile fear, fear of punishment is the effect of a still unformed faith. But even when our faith is formed, shaped, so to speak, thanks to charity, if we realize what it is that we believe ^{why we} ~~what we~~ do, we are still in fear and trembling.

If not, we would be of little faith ^{in that measure}. Distance so great between God's immensity and excellence and ourselves that we, like the Blessed Angels - and it is the Powers that singled out - that we should tremble to our very foundations - Tremendum Potestatis.

Yet, it is not only God's excellence, his limitless perfection, wisdom and goodness, his almightiness, that are awesome; it is also the fact that He is so close and intimate to us, even more so than we are devotedly to ourselves. I have not the slightest awareness of this intimacy, of my being entirely in his power, of the fact that I am more present to him than I am to myself, and shamefully know and irresistibly moved, yet I believe it all. That not a sparrow falls to the ground without the will of the Father.

And when the one who has faith sees the enormity of evil in this world, ^{and carry it from his own office} the evil of which he himself is capable, he still holds to the infinite goodness of God who would ^{allow it if} it could not be for God the occasion of a greater good. The Christian faith is ^{more} radically optimistic in the face of evil and error, facing the fact that God's plan, from the start, ~~was~~ was thrown out of joint. The Christian does not make his belief depend upon his own ability to convince himself of all this by his own reasoning and speculation. If he does believe, it is because he has been given faith by God, not because he acquired it through his own efforts. This would be Pelagianism, which, in our attitude towards unbelieving neighbours, all too easily infects us.

la définition essentielle de l'homme. Conception.

1^o Finis { a. ~~propter~~ Privatis
b. deus et eternum B.V.

2^o Modus { a. in primo instanti
deinité → b. in huius modum q' per salutem

Nota est. unde { gratiam separativam.
" gratiam.

Cette grâce, comme la grâce séparative, dépend
des mérites du J. accordé par pure
miséricorde.

de l'union de grâce, participatif à la vie divine, union
qui au terme, constitue une union étroit
l'union des trois pers. et le monde. N'oublie
plus q' d'ne par as au l'homme à l'homme.
Mais aussi une a. en fil et l'union avec de la
grâce salutaire dans sa divinité, et à l'humanité
du Christ, cette union de cette grâce. Et l'union
de plus est une au l'union incarnée.

Cette union est : In imperio. N'c in mundum
In imperio. N'c in hoc mundo (40-46)
In salutem. N'c de mundo. (46-52)
In salutem. N'c post hanc vitam. (53-59)

...

Il se comporte à l'endroit du Christ comme le ferait le Père éternel s'il pouvait être envoyé.

Arrêtons-nous un instant à un caractère tout à fait éminent de la famille dont S. Joseph est le chef par son autorité et par son caractère de père quant aux deux bienfaits dont il est la cause propre.

La famille est une société, et encore une société naturelle, plus stable, c'est le voeu de la nature, que la société politique. Or toute société se définit par un bien commun. Quel est le bien commun d'une famille? C'est l'enfant. Qui est l'enfant de la Ste Famille? Une Personne divine, le souverain bien. Le mariage de Joseph et de Marie était en vue de ce bien, dont tout autre bien n'est qu'une lointaine participation.

En outre, l'enfant contribue à la stabilité de la famille. Les époux sans enfants se séparent plus facilement que ceux qui sont unis par l'enfant. Or, l'enfant ~~en question~~ dont il s'agit, est une Personne divine, immuable, indéfectible. Les membres de cette famille forment ainsi la société la plus parfaite, la plus immuable qui se puisse concevoir. Et c'est de cette famille qu'est né l'Eglise, le corps du Christ.

Voilà qui est S. Joseph. Et c'est lui qui a déclaré au monde le nom propre du Verbe incarné, savoir Jésus, c'est-à-dire, Sauveur. C'est une fonction qui revient au père. Et en cela, dit S. Thomas, il était le ministre du Père éternel.

Il y a encore une autre convenance entre Joseph et le Père éternel. L'un et l'autre sont des artisans. Dieu le Père est l'artisan de l'univers tout entier. Joseph fut un artisan, un charpentier, et c'est au moyen de son art qu'il gagna de quoi nourrir et élever le Verbe Incarné, *qui, comme Fils de Dieu, n'est pas du Père éternel.*

Nous savons que la Ste Vierge, par sa maternité divine, touche à l'Union hypostatique, car c'est en elle que la divinité du Verbe s'est unie à l'humanité. Mais Joseph, lui aussi, touche, à sa façon, à cette union, puisque la croissance du Christ et la conservation de sa chaire était confiées à ce père: dont il dépendait physiquement. Sa vie dépendait du travail manuel de ~~Joseph~~ Joseph, qui d'ailleurs a protégé la vie du Christ contre ceux qui voulaient le mettre à mort.

Il n'est pas étonnant que Léon XIII, dans sa célèbre encyclique Quoniam Pluries, déclare que de tous les saints, y compris les anges les plus sublimes, c'est Joseph qui vient immédiatement après la Ste Vierge en dignité.

Je termine sur deux points:

(a) le caractère caché de S. Joseph: qui lui convient en tant qu'image du Père éternel invisible;

(b) la barbe de patriarche: c'est ainsi que l'art chrétien représente le Père éternel. Et parce que dans l'âme du chrétien la relation du père nourricier du Christ/est comprise, quoique souvent d'une manière seulement confuse, il se représente ~~imaginativement~~ S. ~~Joseph~~ Joseph d'une manière semblable à celle dont nous nous imaginons le Père du Verbe de Dieu.

du Père éternel

L'Eglise ne pouvait honorer davantage S. Joseph qu'en citant comme l'évangile de sa solennité, le passage de S. Luc: (p. 221)

Il y a quelques mois on me demandait si notre ange gardien est supérieur à S. Joseph. Je viens répondre à cette question. Vous me permettrez de faire un certain détour.

Les peintres et les sculpteurs chrétiens nous présentent S. Joseph ~~comme~~ comme un vieillard, avec une barbe de patriarche. Or nous savons que la Ste Vierge n'a pas épousé un vieux célibataire mais un homme tout jeune, ~~un adolescent~~ un adolescent qui, selon la coutume du temps, avait à peine vingt ans. Certains artistes modernes, au fait de cette coutume, ont essayé de représenter S. Joseph comme un adolescent. Mais cela ne prend pas. Le peuple chrétien en reconnaît le bien-fondé, mais préfère le patriarche d'un âge plutôt avancé. Cette attitude est-elle bien chrétienne? Cette préférence a-t-elle un fondement ~~justifiable~~ qui la justifie?

Qui est S. Joseph?

Il est l'époux de la Mère de Dieu. Qu'est-ce, au juste que d'être un époux? Posons plutôt la question telle que S. Thomas l'a formulée, et écoutons sa réponse. (1.186-187.)

Pour comprendre toute la portée de cette doctrine, qui conclut que S. Joseph, sans être père géniteur du Christ, mérite quand même le nom de père, il faut s'en rapporter à Aristote qui, dans son Ethique, caractérise la paternité par les trois bienfaits que voici: la génération, le bienfait le plus fondamental, mais qui est l'oeuvre d'une puissance purement naturelle et irrationnelle; la nutrition, car c'est le père qui par son travail doit gagner le pain pour son enfant; troisièmement, la discipline.

S. Joseph est père du Christ quant aux deuxième et troisième bienfaits: et il mérite le nom de père ~~parce qu'il~~ non seulement parce qu'il a nourri et élevé le Fils de Dieu, le Verbe Incarné, mais il a fait cela comme époux de la Mère de Dieu.

obéit Le Christ s'est donc mis dans la dépendance d'un père nourricier, qui dirigeait ses pas, qui ordonnait son travail. C'est dire que le Verbe Incarné a fait nourrir sa chair par Joseph, qu'il lui a obéi. Dieu ~~né~~ à un homme, chef de famille, qui le nourrit et ainsi le fait grandir dans son humanité.

Festa nutritoris Jesu
Colant fideles servuli:
qui humano pavit esu
Nutritorem saeculi.

A qui le père nourricier de celui par qui toutes choses sont faites ressemble-t-il? Il est père du Fils qui procède du Père éternel. Il est, sur terre, l'Image du Père éternel.

Et voici la convenance. Le Fils de Dieu, du Père éternel a été envoyé; le S. Esprit aussi a paru visiblement, sous la forme d'une colombe et de langues de feu. Mais le Père n'a jamais été envoyé, et ne pourrait pas l'être, car il est le principe: c'est lui qui envoie. Il peut venir, mais il ne peut être envoyé. Pour y remédier, en quelque sorte, il s'est fait représenté auprès de son Fils par une personne qui est son image comme père: le père nourricier, à qui obéit ce même Fils, et qui élève le Verbe fait chair.

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Scientia boni et mali.

Engl:

① Genesis iii

② Triplex cognitio boni et mali
The kind desired →

spec. tt

practica formalitatis

omitt. modis practica: here defect,
uncertainty, insecurity.

Knowledge: known & the
appetite: → res.

③ What we desired was good: div. felicity.

But the means wrong: eat ^{forbidden} fruit of tree of knowledge.

Appropriate that serpent should tempt the woman with
promise of security. Bankers and bishops. Mortal's chiefest enemy.

Eve's sin, implicitly a protestation against our finitude, generally,
and against the naturally uncertain condition of man,
inasmuch as ~~man~~ we are subject to the rules of chance
and fortune.

Fr.

④ Chance & fortune in our lives: the things we do not choose:

yet told
impossible
for all this

[Parents; birth (concepta antequam) in ^{genetic structure} quality of mind; place,
time; shape of one; condition of parents. ... Now, condition of subject
And we remain exposed to slings and arrows of outrageous fortune.

Latm

Quid fortuna?

Impunity on part of cause and of effect. Group of limitations in
Knowledge.

Yet, a chance effect may have a cause. Marked and remarked.
Adversus a where to slip.

Engl.

⑤ God above chance and fortune.

French.

How to choose the things about which we have no choice.

Conforming to will of Father. "Thy will be done". Not easy.
In Christ, contrast between human will and divine.
Accidents did not diminish His suffering, his Passion.

Sc. boni et mali

Engl.

① Gen. iii

② Threelold Knowledge of evil { spec. tt. } copulatio tt.
form. practica } appet. ← } incerta, sed diffin.
omnib. modis pract. }

③ Insecurity of active life.

④ In what /int parents' insecurity?

⑤ Eve desired good. But means?

Appropriate that devil should tempt woman. Bishops, Bankers.
Mammy. (B.V.)

Protest against finitude, specially human limitation and
condition of subjection. Stings and arrows. Security is
mortal's chief enemy.

Fr. p. 12-14

Lat. ① Quid fortuna.

Ca per — — —

Duplex infinitas..... ex parte causae; ex parte effectus.

② Eff. fortuitus vel casualis potest tamen habere causam per se.

③ Ultima causa ^{per se} huiusmodi contingens, ratione effectus voliti.

Fr. p. 15-17.

A. E.

Familiarity of our beliefs. From childhood.

As it should be. But we must measure

in our Faith. And as we do, we begin to realize
how extraordinary are the beliefs we hold so

Faith held: { firmly. } the power of assent: & specific 80. Free pft. } no force.
Faith held: { the object: & auditive: Free assent.

First effect of Faith: Fear, awe:

Peril: of punishment

Fatal: in face of immensity, excellence of God; incredible
distance that separates us from Him. Tremendous
Potestates. Yet closer than we are to ourselves

Awe some truths, that are scandal to some, stupidity to others.

The Trinity. The presence of the Trinity in us.

The Incarnation

By birth from woman.

The Eucharist: real presence. — death of God. Second coming.

The authority of the Bishop of Rome.

The graces and privileges of Mary.

The Foster Father of X.

Do you wonder that people should be astonished at the things we
believe? Duo: These things are extraordinary, beyond our grasp.
We cannot hold them of ourselves. Faith is freely given.

The question of religious freedom.

Can we look down on them who believe otherwise, and
say "Lord, I thank thee that I am not like the rest
of men?" Our faith, even like our life, is a gift
of divine mercy. The most awesome thing would be
to forget this.

Downgrading St. Thomas?

Which one? The one who is being taught? Yes.

He is not being taught in a philosophical way. Like a catechism.

What we today mean by scholasticism is the kind of philosophy and theology we get from textbooks. These I would characterize as treatises which provide answers to questions which no one has raised.

Tendency to oversimplification. This most striking in the so-called technical vocabulary that philosophy got itself caught up in. "Techn. vocabulary" very important in the experimental sciences; in highly specialized sciences. Words are soon replaced by symbols. But symbols are not words.

What are words? → to signify things as we know them.

Must first signify what we know first.

E.g. "matter." Someone trained in textbook philosophy may be inclined to think that it means "prime matter". Actually - - - - - ^{UP} material

Idem for "form".

Idem for "essence", "quiddity". "What".

"Existence" — Phil. an animal who just sits on his "essence".

"Being"

"inhere", eight meanings: in place
part in whole
whole in part, etc. - - -

"cause"; "abstraction"; "syllogism".

We should always be able to lead an extended meaning to a more primitive one; else we do not know what we are talking about.

S. Thomas very unknown. Should be put on the index. Unknown specially in his philosophical commentaries. There is no S. Th. about to be downgraded.

One of chief defects: students in phil. have no
literary background; insufficient math. formation.
As it is, the students will seek in phil. the kind
of satisfaction that only poetry can provide; or the
kind of rigor that is to be found only in
symbolic logic & math.

Heisenberg

Schrodinger

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How can we understand the human condition as it was described in the first lecture? We emphasized the things over which we have no choice, and that with regard to them our condition is one of subject. But is it simply true that existence is not of our choosing? Whatever may have been the role of chance and fortune in bringing Socrates to existence, and however little he can be per se intended by nature, he does have a per se cause who intends him qua this individual. When Socrates comes to know this, and acknowledges in a practical manner that God made him and wants him to exist; and when he conforms his will to God's intention, he chooses to exist: in rendering homage to God's goodness, his will becomes as it were one with the will of God that freely wants him to be. And ~~this~~ thus he participates in the divine freedom that is his cause.

Now, if by existence we meant no more than ~~the fact~~ that in virtue of which it is true to say that Socrates exists, whereas the Son he might have had does not, we would be taking 'existence', and the corresponding choice in a rather superficial sense. If he is to conform to the will of God, his choice must imply the kind of existence that he is inasmuch as he did not choose it by himself - such as 'a man of feeble intellect', born in ~~some~~ circumstances, of poverty, or of wealth, etc. → ∞ - and, most importantly, his will must conform to the kind of person he ought to become in his actions - and this for the sake of the One who made him, and let him become as he was and in the circumstances that are his.

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In this 'first voluntaria' we transcend the necessities that we are subject to. I do not refer to a mere state of resignation in the face of necessity. It is an active state of willing what God wills us to be. And He wills us to be good, as we learn in the first principal of action: to do good and to avoid evil. (Without knowledge of this principal we could not even act as human beings.)

It is good to
act, but not
enough. It
might become
better not
to act.
Melius non esse
quam esse.

Now, to be as we ought to be, it is not enough to be, not even to be absolutely. In God that is enough: *bonus per se*. Nor is it enough to be good inasmuch as we are. *Bonum quod dividit eis: eis bonum secundum quid*, and *bonum simpliciter*. The 'esse substantiale' of the lowest of the devils is the most perfect of all creatures, in the line of 'esse substantiale'.

We are as we ought to be when in our action, we are properly related to our end. Thus it is in our action that we attain to the highest kind of being: that we are in conformity with God's purpose - viz. the highest good.

Now these actions do not flow from our nature as properties, nor can what we must do here and now be known to us by way of a conclusion drawn from our nature. We do not have that kind of nature. A rational nature is not, with regard to its actions, that kind of nature. And if, in this context, such a nature were intended, we would say 'man has no nature'. It is an agens a proposito.

Proof of God's
existence.

Actions are in this singular, and cannot be reached in the mode of science. Prudence is the virtue of action.

And we live in the things that are, not in those that might have been. Some people pass their life dreaming in the world of *petitibilis*.

Prudence takes council, considers the contingent circumstances, and its right judgment depends upon right appetite. No amount of sheer ratiocination will by itself ensure right behaviour. We must really want to do right and submit to the conditions required.

One of the essential factors of the good life is that must accept the uncertainties of our being and the attending circumstances. Not as the Stoics do; but because God wills, or permits them. Notwithstanding the precariousness of our being, our point of view must be that of God: the eternal and immutable.

We are temporal beings, measured by time. And time is in a sense composed of what is not: for the past is no longer, and the future is not yet. Our actual existence is in the ever vanishing instant that divides ~~past~~ past from future. It is the most tenuous kind of existence that can be. And, besides, we are temporary. We contain within ourselves our own negation: privation. There is in us a potency of simultaneous contradiction - which implies no contradiction. But it does mean that a person we shall not be for long - in fact it may come any time. Our person teeters on the edge of nothingness. We are the flies of every wind that blows. Not Sartre's 'mouches', unless that is what we want. Like the birds of the Gospel we do not fall to earth, or to dust, without the care of the Father.

Heidegger makes much of death - and so do we. Death is more important than life inasmuch as it is in death that we shall acquire our fixed being - for better or for worse. The essential thing for us is to die the right death - and

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The only way of achieving this is to live now as we should.

We, too, dread death. The reasons may be many.

- There is a natural one. It was part of Christ's passion - for he feared death, ~~for~~ ... Fortitude. Worry about the body: 'non corpus'.
- Another is the care for those we leave behind. Faith in Providence.
- Finally, we cannot be fully certain that in death we shall be as we ought to be. We cannot ~~know~~ how God sees us. Nec in ipsum iudicio. But here we have the virtue of Hope.

Choice of religion.

There is the respect in which we are strangers to another - nolite iudicare. Stranger to myself, too. For the 'objective' (being of object) that we have in the mind of neighbor is not necessarily that which is truly ours. Our true being is the one that we have as God knows it. This uncertainty is transcended by Hope.

- And when are we truly as we should be - whether we actually know that we are or actually do not know? When we have charity. He exists most fully, most perfectly, who has the greatest charity. It is charity that unites and transcends the present disorder, and it does transcend it now. And there is no other peace. Diligentibus semum omnia cooperantur in bonum. It is only in charity that we can become reconciled with our lot in a positive way, in a way that is strictly divine.
- And it is charity that determines the ultimate perfection. For it is not the degree of native intelligence that will determine the measure of human glory - but the degree of charity that we have at death.

5

Our condition is one of servants - mancipia: slaves. It enters into the very definition of religion: "virtus per quam aliquis ad dei servitium et cultum aliquid exhibet."

It may appear strange to you, but the most complete answer to pessimistic existentialism in the face of the sound and fury and stings and arrows of outrageous fortune is given by the ~~"religiosi (contra. of life)"~~ those who "anonymasie dicuntur religiosi dicuntur - illi qui se totaliter mancipant divinis servitio, quam holocaustum deo offerentes." This by following the evangelical counsels. Obedience. For nothing requires greater confidence in God's wisdom and will than to submit to the will of another in matters pertaining to the state of perfection. It is, in fact, the most perfect way of participating, even now, in the knowledge of good and evil.

There is nothing base about obedience to God in the will of the Superior. It is the highest form of freedom we can possess here below. Even God himself has practiced it in the Person of the Incarnate Word: Factus est obediens usque ad mortem. It is the evil one who said "Non servorum!" He is the real slave. They are true masters who are willing ^{in the service of God.}

These words are harsh to the ~~soon~~ ears of the humanist who leads to despair in trying to make man the measure of all things in the attempt to fill the gap between things as they are and things as they should be.

We have no other final answer but the love God and neighbor for the love of God.

For some time now philos. and sc. have been considered as utterly distinct activities. In earlier days scientists were philosophers. But, very gradually, one could be known as a philosopher without being a scientist. This goes back as far as the Middle Ages.

∴ I compare St. Albert & St. Thomas. Just what were they doing? The same, but with a difference. St. Thomas wrote a comm. on Aristotle's Meteorology, but made no researches of his own. What he did do is show why a philos. should be concerned about meteorology. Why? Wonder, not just about the obvious diff., but about things in their connection. Quid animal? - - Fire. But what is a mammal? What an elephant? His physiology? etc. etc. -

Philosophy required a division of labour.

What was St. Thomas chiefly concerned with? If we read his theol. works we notice that he uses very little of ~~what we call~~ Aristotle's more concrete works in natural philosophy. He ~~uses~~ confines himself largely to generalities, and these are important, in themselves, and for the purpose of the theologian.

These generalities, and their discussion, must be taken up, at least logically, before the more concrete, more particular questions are raised [these Aristotle had called "the greater matters, such as the phenomena of the sun and the moon,"].

Let us take a look into some of these generalities still under discussion by the most advanced phers of our time - at least until recently.

The very first philosophers - pre-Socr. - asked themselves ^{basic} old questions, such as ... [By the way, if you open a book by Parmenides on the Unum, you will see that he may begin by a remark like ---] Water, air, fire etc. Then, more abstract, $\alpha\tau\tau\epsilon\iota\phi\omega\delta$. Again something close to sense, such as Democritus's atoms. Very scanty experimental evidence.

Yet all this time phers began to wonder about earlier ~~subjects~~ subjects. Parmenides. [Read Heisenberg and Schrodinger on these subjects.] Are things so basically one that there is no more than the appearance of change? By the way, what is change? What does mean by infinity in nature? By place or space? By time? The history of philor. shows that these simple questions about things we appear to know well turn out to be very difficult. (St Augustine)

But whatever the answers, the discussion is very involved, takes more and more time And, eventually, ^{more concrete} knowledge is still to be had. -- Ex. of time. -- Now, when I ask, for instance, what the speed of light is where the constant of velocity is to be found, I cannot discover it by definition (also which there never was much agreement). Today, the speed of light appears to be such a constant.

In the meantime it was realized that the people who made major contributions were not stopped by the initial difficulties ---

History of Sc. proves that it is possible to
start concrete investigation - ---

So-called nominal definitions satisfactory.

[Actually, from the beginning, philosophers often
wound up with real definitions, that denied their
definitions.]

Now have a vast amount of knowledge acquired by people
who never asked themselves - - - And they are
scientists of the most eminent kind.

If any conclude herefrom that phil. and Sc.
are utterly distinct activities: What are we to
think of this? Not true in Aristotle's mind, nor
in that of St. Th., nor in the mind of Emmanuel
Kant.

What we today call a philos. - if these men
just mentioned are right - must be a person who
deeply desires to know all that science can
provide. [Cassirer, Bergson] If they did not
have this desire, if they had no idea of how the
scientist acquires his knowledge, nor generally, what his
these investigations are about - no philosopher.

What about the scientist? Emman. scientists have
answered this question. ~~W. Heisenberg~~ Heisenberg.

Quid ordinary language? Deals with things readily
known and the words used are readily wiped. It is
used to express very common things - change, time, truth,
achievement, ~~birth~~ birth, sensation, understanding, etc.
animal, man, living thing, etc. - -

When we asked "What is change?" we move to a different level. Proper conceptualizations.

What is the relevance of the concepts of ordinary language. ^{Russell's prejudice.} ~~Reisenburg.~~ - Russell and the astronomers.

Schrodinger on "man outside".

∴ To be a philor.; which he should be - quote Max Born - the scientist must be able to talk to himself as a man.

This is what philor. of science is about.

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- 1° Quid felicity.
 - { not in pleasure of senses - nisi
 - { not in fame and renown
 - { not in riches and temporal power
 - { practical
 - { speculative
- 2° Natural felicity:
 - human - commensurate with most - practical
 - divine - speculative
- 3° Supernatural:
 - strictly divine: vision of God.
 - participation in divine: by vision.
 - { Quid grace.
 - { Quid lumen gloriae.
- 4° House and Mansions.
 - Quid "house", quid "mansions".
 - "House" dupliciter:
 - (a) In which God inhabits: saints:
 - { (1) by Faith: Church militant
 - { (2) fruition: Church triumphant
 - } Why "house" & "mansions".
 - (b) God Himself in Himself - we in Him. "In hac domo nos colimus": "domus gloriae": vision & charity. Faith.
 - Mansions: divine participations.
- 5° Common food: root of love of neighbors.
 - Why God in neighbors?
 - Especially in Misery.
- 6° Why we should commiserate with God in neighbors. Blood - life - redeeming blood.

Philosophy and the common citizen of tomorrow.

Growing awareness of thought, even in the Philosophy and the men in Napoleon and so forth. My needs for all that who enjoy social responsibility. Hence, all citizens. Public help services in public housing, ideas must be prepared - after to judge. But no longer under. Political action. But one form. Seeds alone - also in mechanical fields. Science no longer but - making of machine....

LecturesThere is no escape.

The universal turmoil and despair are gaining expression in everyday life. No more dreamlands - nothing with planning for - we'll just plan.

Do what we can, but our faith must not be based on the real possibility of success. We must try to do good without the assurance that it will be of any avail. That is the real good. We must have faith in the present. The only future that counts is made in the present.

There will soon be no country even remotely worthy of a human being.

3 11
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(A)

I Logic of revolution.

Two kinds of Thought = two kinds of logic:

Metaphysics }
Dialectics } just Stalin.

Ex. of transformation by revolution from idea of reaching limit. logic of negation.

II Natural philosophy of evolution:

(a) Aristotelian interpretation of becoming: three principles.

Marxian: 2 principles: identity of privation & matter; form.

(b) Identity of logical & real: Hegel: logical thought gives birth to real things.

Identity of real with matter: Marx.

- Contradiction in things. (Stalin II).

- Transition very easy, because in dial. mode, new form from matter,
by purely quantit. growth.

Birth by destruction: good from evil, as health from disease.

III Social philosophy of revolution.

breakers of strong, but shapers of weak. Proper through conflict within of classes as antagonies:
possessors & depossessed. Solution: natural: revolt of depossessed:
not "just" or "reasonable", but violence of evil: justice by injustice.

IV Theological implications of revolution.

(a) Emancipation of man from all that is better than himself.

Proper by transformation and dominance over matter:

emancipation of "worker": subordination of thought to
manual labor! Revolution as work.

Idea, in opposition to religion. B.C. 115.

(b) Lever of revolt: pride in misery. Idea, only "right".

(c) Limit: communism: to be reached by series of negations: limit:
self-possession and enjoyment of self.

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⑧ I Dialectic:

(a) Indeed, tends to reach beyond metaphysics.

(b) Via negationis, most profound.

But, we tend toward what better than ourselves.

Opposition between Dionys. & Marx.

We are called to life beyond us absolutely: called to others. But not contrast.

II Merry and misery.

He, homo, evil occasion for mercy and higher elevation: felix culpa.
miraculous, *quis super omnia opera eius.*

~~He, homo, evil occasion for mercy and higher elevation: felix culpa.~~ (This idea in Feuerbach)

He, guardian contrast between misery indulged, and power of God.

Revelation and liberation by God, not by secret power of our own.

Sign of power of weak, blessed mother: totam habet substantiam.

III Indeed conflict universal.

Angels, sec. nat., peaceful order: tranquillity.

Elevation to super-nat. order, occasion for revolt.

Revolt of mankind.

blood of world & blood of Christ.

God himself participates in battle, by only begotten Son: who comes

destroyed: *terminus sum et non homo. In finem in hunc profundi.*

Revelation of universal order: *qua above angel.*

IV Man must be emancipated from self: *non gramen flumini, cadens in*

terram, mortuum fuerit. To his soul, must lose it.

Importance of matter: presence of God in creation, provides rd.

in material universe. Matter in Eucharist, deepest mystery

of faith: God most hidden, latent of humanitas.

Manual labor: humble, the powerful. St. Joseph.

heirs of world, pride. He attack upon divine mercy, root of all

things: *nemo indignus misericordia quam superbum meretur.*

He, revolt against mercy, most universal, most profound

enunciator.

1. "I am black, but beautiful".
 Beautiful: sic: order & proportion. Now, the principle.
 But why black?

2. Relation to be found in divine Mercy.

Mercy: prima eadix
 causalissima causarum. } Omnis via Domini misericordia et veritas.
 Virtue of the superior qua superior → inferior
 Act of mercy consists in elevating the inferior.
 Mercy is creation. But greater ^{than} extended to elevation of ^{the} inferior: miserationes ipsae
 super omnia opera ipsa.

3. Natural order in the universe. "Angeli vident fortitudinem et virtutem majorem..."

As to substance: { essence } simplicity
 { existence } composition { from matter } maintenance of species by generation.
 { principle } diffusion
 chance: disorder. → darkness of substance.
 As to knowledge: Intuition of essence
 species
 small number } → darkness of human intellect: pure potency.
 infinity } Knowledge depends on matter: we
 can have light only in the darkness of
 matter itself.
 As to actions: natural order,
 angelic will cannot fail.
 ↓
 2x nature: { spirit form } conflict possible.
 { common form }

Compared to what above us in this order, we, by nature black.

4. "Your light will ^{from} arise ^{from} darkness, and your darkness will ^{shine} as the noon
 "Orbita in lucis lux tua, et tenebrae tuae erunt sicut meridies."

(a) Elevation to angelic nature, incomparable act of mercy.

But this possible in many ways.

- (1) Immediate, as in angels.
- (2) By ^{spirit} mission, by ^{union} through hypostatic union with a created nature.
 sic, descensus.
- (3) Assumption of angelic nature.
- (4) " " human nature. More mercy, because less dignified.
- (5) Immediate assumption.
- (6) By birth, uti dependent upon creation as cause of generation.

fixus sum in limbo
 repandit - et non est
 interitum. "I stick fast
 in the mire of the deep:
 and there is no one
 standing."

→ possible only at lower limit of universal order, at darkness of matter & pain

Thence, generation of Son, at very extreme of time { from Father in nat. universe.
from Mother in mat. universe.
Mater summi. Spiritus Sanctus et
genius salvatorum.

His, first meaning of "I am black, but beautiful".

Beautiful because of divine maternity.

But, as part creature, maternity possible only because of darkness,
potentiality of material substance: privation.

It is only because of this that God can proceed from and within
his creation. Thus becomes possible a first principle which
is Diogenes. Only here can the Pure Act find echo.

5. Abyssus abyssum invocat: deep calleth on deep: One abyssus, echoes the other.
Depth of power on the depth of weakness; abyss of plenitude
finds echo in abyss of emptiness.

"Quia respexit... Because he hath regarded the humility of his handmaid...
Angels could not make such an act of humility."

6. Felix culpa.

Deeper manifestation of mercy.

Redemption possible because of corruption of human intellect:
because of corrup., reasons open to mercy.

7. Mater misericordiae: looked in causalissima causarum. Herself, first cause
of Supreme Mercy.
Regina misericordiae: because of participation in universality of first cause.
She is mercy.

Manifestation of this quality in person: brings out the house of divinity.

Vermis, et non homo, sed Christus.

Magna velut mare contribit terra.

6
I had been foretold to Mary, at the Annunciation.....

1° Salvation by redemption - and pardon.

Greater dignity for man. In person of Christ accord. to human nature.
Greater dignity when human person can share.... as a universal cause
This had through Mary's Coredemption:

Divine maternity

Immaculate conception

gratia...
propter
separatim

Perfection of X's Friendship.

} affinity to Christ { nature }
grace. } Companion

2° Perfection of Christ's Kingship.

King in proper sense, not metaph. of one nature with us, but ^{in person} ^{expressing}
Rules with consent of people: Fiat mulier. Matrimonium
Spirituale. In proportion with our nature.

Common good and personal good idem. Kingly concept.

Universal cause in this rule. Affairs singular actions
distinctly.

3. Mary related to this King as Mother: Throne of David.

But also as New Eve to New Adam.

Her coredemptive causality also universal, though
subordinate. New Eve by giving spiritual birth to us.

But the New Adam is King, and by concept.

The Queen, by concept: their entry was common, as their
struggle.

Role of Assumption) → Qua puer: intercession, mercy, "Seasons puer".

"It becomes the throned monarch better than his crown."

Rules with consent as manifested by the teaching of the Church.
4. Mary's role as Queen first manifested at Pentecost: Through her
intercession God sent the Holy Ghost, the fulness of Spirit,
which is our confirmation. Thus special relation
between Confirmation and Christ & Mary as King and
Queen...

5. Not remote, like earthly Kings and Queens: they attain
singular. Their rule a hidden one - through the sound
and the pray. So immediate, close, and unperceived, that it

appears hidden - like all things closed to us. God's presence of immensity.

Yes, thanks to J & M., it is a continual rule.

Thus the dominion which extends to --- see copy p. 4

Conférences + Cours (1959-1960)

Plan

- The Familiar World and the Scientific
- The Diversity of Natural Science
- The Unity less apparent
- Appendix : Science and the Possible

I = 4 pp. petites
II = 5 pp. feuilles
III = 2 pp.

(M. De Kuenich a. indicat) SUMMER 1960

Pages mêlées :

Principe

~~Conférence de S. Th. - Phys. I~~
~~Sept 15, 1959~~

Cours à partir des Comm. de S. Th. - Phys. I.

10-XI-59

Plan

I

- The Familiar world and the Scientific.
How they are related.
- The Diversity of Natural Science.
- The unity - less apparent.
- Appendix: Science & the Possible.

Summer 1960

⑦

Main problem: how the world of common sense (the 'familiar world') is related to the world of advanced experimental science, especially to that of theoretical physics.

Edmundson's two tables.

Some interpret this to mean that the familiar world is largely one of illusion, of mind-spinning: that man, as we name him, and man as a swarm of electrical charges are in different worlds. ~~And~~ Some draw the corollary that only the sc. world is real, and the familiar of the stuff that dreams are made on.

Let me read to you another passage from this important work (N.P.W. p.251)

This appears to show that physics is not concerned with elephants except as to their man, which they can share equally with the same amount of coal. Physics is indiff. to elephants as such.

Ed. Most certainly does not mean that there is no connection between the elephant

(2)

we name him,
and the physicist's view of his sliding
down the slope. The absence of connection
will be regretted if we elect to cut the elephant
with the result that we had so named
disappears from the scene. (The electrocution
was possible because an elephant is in fact
a swarm of electrical charges.) But this
is much like rejecting subjective idealism
in Dr Johnson's way. (I repeat it then, he
is reported to have said, and kicked a
stone.)

We are often told the scientific outlook
is so much more exact than that of common
sense knowledge.

Just what do we mean by common s. kn.?
Knowledge expressed by ordinary language,
which uses words such as 'man', 'horse', 'sun',
'house', 'tree', etc. - Aristotle's vocabulary
is largely taken from the man in the street.
To answer the question 'What is a man?' he
will again use words found in ordinary
language. All of Met. I is devoted to
the various meanings of basic names,
such as *monocycle*, *car*, *element*, *power*,
whole and part. Verifiable....

Some people in phil. of sc. have strong opinions on the kind of knowledge that can be expressed in words as distinguished from technical language, such as that of theoretical physics.

There is a passage from a lecture given some years ago by the eminent mathematician & theoretical physicist - Hermann Weyl (p. 1836; 1837).

Notice, however, that Weyl & Speiser have used words, ^{not symbols} to convey their opinion, and they could hardly have done otherwise.

1848 — And why not? This is one of the questions we will attempt to answer.

Meanwhile we must agree that theoretical physics faces us with a concrete rock of reality such as ^{the} nuclear explosions, ^{as} the outgrowth of symbolic construction.

All the same, ^{every} ~~all~~ theoretical physicist agrees with Weyl's view of the matter. Here is a very different one, expressed by Prof. Werner Heisenberg of the uncertainty relation in Quantum theory. (p. 168-169)
172-173
200; 201

(4)

Just what does he mean by 'natural'
language. Not that nature produces
words. the way she produces the organ
of speech. Words are the works of reason,
but devised to express first of all things
first known and to express further
knowledge derived from these things first
known.

The long quotation inflicted upon you yesterday may have obscured the issue. Quot. necessary for the proper appearance of the issue. Here is this issue in resume:

Eddington contrasts sets in contrast the familiar world and the scientific one. Later on he calls the latter a shadowy world of symbols. His dissonance of the elephant left us in wonder. Whatever knowledge we have of the elephant, is it true? Is it true that what I saw at the zoo was an elephant? Is the distinction between elephant and horse a true distinction?

Then we heard Weyl tell us that to reach "the concrete rock of reality," we must abandon the use of words, which only "betray reality." Still, he pointed out that words must be used, even a proper of mathematics (whose game is played in silence, without words) when the rules of the game come under discussion, or the possibilities of the game - all of which "goes on in the medium of words and appears bewilderment." He nowhere explains why.

II ②

Accordingly, we can use neither Redding nor Weyl to bridge the gap they see between these two worlds. Putting it this way, we could well be over-simplifying what was in fact their mind as the subject.

On the other hand, Prof. Heisenberg proves most helpful on the subject by pointing to the relevance of words, the elements of natural language, even to the theoretical physicist, to express the degree of understanding that has been reached. (This is the end of the quotation which I began to read yesterday, p. 200-201.)

Why should words and what they stand for be of such importance. It is knowledge expressed by ordinary language that is in immediate contact with reality, Heisenberg said. The point is that if some of the knowledge we express in ordinary language were not true and definitive, it would be impossible to raise a question, not even a scientific one. As I said, we would have definitions without definita.

Notice, however, that true knowledge, when vague, can be associated with numerous errors about the very thing that true knowledge is had. For instance, if someone asks for water, he does not expect petrol. But this does not mean that he knows exactly what water is. Before chemical analysis we knew what water is sufficiently to name it. But names, such as 'water' or 'man' signify confused wholes. The confusion is in our knowledge, not in the thing.

Now, we readily confuse indistinct knowledge with exact knowledge.

For millennia people thought they knew exactly what water is, or what blood, ~~muscle~~ flesh, and bone are. It is precisely when confuse indistinction with exactness that we fall into error. And this is true for the most part.

To return to the example of water, it was once believed to be a dense substance, continuous like a geometrical body. Now this is false. Does it mean we

did not know what water is?

Distinguo: enough to name it, yes;
 enough to define it, no. When we
 do attempt to define it, we must
 be aware that our definition will
 be provisional, good for the time being.

∴ The distance between ^{the first} definition
 and ~~definition~~ ^{the next} definition
 is infinite, comprising the whole
 universe. This is true even of man.....

The only exception is in mathematics.

E.g. the definition of circle - but

[cf. The Logic of the First Operation, LTP
 vol. XII, 1956, n. 1, pp. 52-72]

then the subjects of mathematics are
 attained by construction, and,
consequenter modum intelligendi, somewhat
 like the second intention of logic, as
 STT says (STI, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, c.)

But notice the difference when we step
into the real world: <sup>one dimension,
motion of a point</sup>

(a) What is length? (Metaph.; Math.)

(b) What is length? (Physicist)

Standard Measure. No natural
standard length is known, e.g. a
minimum, or a maximum.

(Heisenberg seeking one)

Major Scholastics, at Caplan, all wrong
here. They thought that there could
be no error in simple apprehension
(1st opn.) except per accidens, i.e. by reason
of composition & division. Did not realize
that there is discourse & reasoning
even in the first - and that most of it
is interminable.

Cf. Phys I, l. 1, n. 10

In Joann. 1, lect. 1

II, 85, 6, c.

The confusion of late scholard. was
a disaster.

Usual way of presenting qur. of intell.:

(a) Simple apprehension, e.g. *quid est lapis*.
No error here, except per accid., as in
case of proper sensibles.

(b) ~~judgment~~, ex. gr., *lapis est corpus*.
combination, *non est asinus*.

(c) reasoning: *Omni compos. & contr. est corrupt.*
Sed homo ita est comp.
Ergo est corruptibilis.

Actually, not that simple:

(a) Having grasped vaguely what a stone is,
there is, within first operation, simple
room for progress. For definitions belong
here: neither true nor false, secundum se.
But they are, in se, good, less good, bad.

(ii) Now, definitions are composites.

(iii) To go from definition to definition, make
discourse - reasoning process.

(iv) Final definition.
Example of 'movement' in the Physics.
Hence 'nature'.

From (i) \longrightarrow IV, infinite distance
near bridged.

History of Science

(b) The composition is true or false.

But may be verisimilar. — probable.

Infinity of degrees.

All these ~~propos~~ enunciations made in words.

[Democritus's 'atopoi', extension of name, but provisional. Here 'earth' of 4 elem. theory. Considered pure earth to be absolutely heavy. Actually extension of word through theory.]

Here bifurcation:

propositions whose terms are valid and definitive, yet dialectical.

propositions whose very terms are questionable. E.g. Democ., or Emped. & Arist. on elements.

(c) Reasoning. Formed in (a)

Middle term.

But earliest meaning 'calculation' computation.

Principles can be taken 'commonly' in two ways:

- (a) as common to principles that are not causes and to causes.
- (b) as common to all principles upon which something depends, in being or in becoming, either per se, or per accidens (privation)

Then the name 'principle' can be appropriated to a certain type of ~~principle~~ principles; namely, ^{such as} ~~principle~~ ^{principle} that relate ~~to~~ to the process of "becoming." - Now, this narrower meaning of principle can be taken in two ways:

- (a) to stand for the cause that has most of all the nature of "id a quo aliquid procedit", namely "causae moventes et agentes;"
- (b) to stand for principles which, whether causes or not, are related to the process of becoming and explain it. These are the principles of the subject of this science. And they must be considered first, for the subject of this science raises a problem. Among these principles, two are causes, the other is privation. Note that privation is manifestly proper to the order of becoming; though a principle, it is not a cause.

lect. I, n. 3.

Notice the reasoning:

Omne qd habet materiam sensibilem (nec potest esse nec
deprivari sine ea).

sed omne huiusmodi est mobile. Ergo.

Why not assign as subject of Natural Sc. "quorum esse dependet
a materia ^{sensibili} nec sine materia deprivari possunt"?

Why drop in "est mobile"?

10, we observe, by induction, that "ea quae!!" are also mobile:
that they owe their being itself to change: it is not that
things themselves and makes them to be as they are.
It is as sensible that we first know them. But their sensibility
does not explain how they arise and why they are as they
are.

Not is it their "material" which is the ^{first} subject of enquiry.
They are with matter, they are not matter. They
are qualified by ~~that~~ "sensible matter", but the
sensibility is ~~not~~ only potential, and relates them to
sense - the knowing power.

Yesterday we noted that these sensible things have
an actuality of their own apart from sense, because
of which they are sensible. But this, of itself, does
not make them "to be sensed". This depends upon
the knowing power. Hence, sensible being is either
the being in itself, and then sensible only in potency.
or it is "sensed"; and then it is the sense in act.
Hence, if this latter were the subject, the sub. of the
science would be the sense in act.

The irrationality in our mind in the face of the real many.

Irrational gaps between natures. We try to overcome this by the interpolation of infinity. Leibniz called this infinity "le fond constitutif et le principe d'intelligibilité du fini," the object of "scientia(m) infinita, ubi intervenit infinitum determinationum." (Maréchal, Leibniz) *Præfatio ad usum: ratio & intellectus.*

Infinity

But if this process could be carried through to identity, the universe would collapse into the absolute irrationality of contradiction. Cf. Hegel, *La notion de l'identité*, in *Essais*, Prefaced by Louis de Bréville, Paris, 1936,

pp. 187-208.

Problem of the excluded middle, must be viewed in the light of the cognitive one: the separ. in int. resolves the distinction between intelligible species. [LTP 1946, vol. 2, n. 2.]

Also accounts for Hegelian and Marxist distinction between Metaph. & Dialectic. [LTP 1950, vol. II, n. 2.]

Doubts and errors 'x igna. privationis' (στέρησις)

1° Some reached 'matter', but inadequately:

Failed to disting. between priv. & matt. Hence, what belongs to privation they attributed to matter. But priv., in itself, non-being; hence matter too. On the other hand, since things become absolutely and per se from matter, so from non-being: ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. They were led to this by two reasons:

(a) One taken from Parm.: whatever is outside being is non-being; but matter is outside or apart from being, since it is not being in act: hence, *ἐτερολογεῖται non ens*.

(b) They believed: *unum subjecto ≡ unum ratione*.

[Arist. here uses *ὁμοῦ καὶ ποσόν*: *potentia unum*.
Vd. S.Th., n. 2, 1st.] The same subject can be of this and of that.

Vd. S.Th.'s 'dicendum', n. 3: 'quid sit potentia materialis'.

In fact, may say 'ratione infinitae potentiae'. This potentia is virtual, primo in individual, to which individual, species and genera to be referred. This import. for n. 7.

2° How this position differs from Aristotle's.

(a) Explains his own mind on the subject: (n. 4)

great diff. between 'to be one in number or subject', and 'to be one in potency a nation'. Now, matter and privation, though one in subject, are other in nation. Made plain by two reasons:

(1) Matter is non-being ^{sed} accidens, privation per se.
E.g. ~~Shapelen~~ 'Shapelen' means non-being, but 'troupe' does not, except insofar as it happens to be shapelen.

(2) Matter is 'near to being a thing and substance', i.e. 'in potentia ad rem', and 'somewhat substance', because enters into the constitution of the substance. This cannot be said of privation, which is what the thing is not.

(3) Manifests platonic position. (n. 5)

The Platonists, too, 'duo ex parte materialis', the great and the small, τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν.

(2)

But then not the same kind of duality as Arist.'s
 matter and privation: one in subj., mixed in notion.
 Whereas they did not dist. the duality into matt. & priv.,
 neither separately nor together. Hence the Platonists' three
 principles, (form, great, small) must be ~~the~~ understood as widely
 diff. from Ar.'s three. For they did reach the idea that
 there must be some one nature underlying natural forms:
 but they believed this to be one in notion as it is one in subject.
 They mention only matter, which includes the great &
 the small, but did not mention privation.

3° Power truth of own position:

(a) Priv. must be disting. from matter. (n. 7)

Matter, the subjected nature, is with form, cause
 of things which ~~are~~ become by nature, 'ad
 modum matris': 'causa generationis in accipiendo'.

~~But privation is rather 'an evil'?~~ ~~quia privatio non est~~
~~et extra totum ens. What Parmenides said is true of~~
~~privation, but not of matter.~~

~~That privation is a kind of evil, Arist. shows by comparing
 it to form which is something divine, best, and desirable,
 appetible.~~

~~[S. Th. explains: divisio: participatio divini esse, qd est
 actus purus.
 optimum ... id. textus et expr. Cg in 69, etc.]~~

~~"Non est autem verum..."~~

(b) Id. per rationem ducentem ad impossibile: (n. 8).

~~If privation appetite, then desires own destruction.~~

~~Matter is appetite for another form.~~

~~[S. Th. notes obj. of Avicenna, n. 9-10]~~

7
Divinum: quia omnis forma quaedam similitudo participata divini est, qd est actus purus.

Ratio: unusquisque in tantum est actus in quantum habet formam. Vd II Q. 54: quid forma principium exendi. 'To be a man' is not taken from existence, but from that by reason of which a man is a man. Cf. Q. D. de An., a. 9, c.

- The arg. is not nat., but metaph. Vd Q. III, 69.

Optimum: forma est actus, est perfectio potentiae.

Actus est perfectio in quantum perfectior alterius per modum appetibilis. Est ergo appetibilis.

[N. B. Forma est optimum in hoc ordine, non simpliciter, quia, quamvis desit esse substantiale, non tamen bonum simpliciter. Cf. Q. D. de Ver. 21, 0.

κακοποιόν

Hoc est operationem, quae, in creat., est in sec. quid.]

Privatio, ut sic, remouet formam; ergo malum.
Unde non idem quod materia.

(4) Makes the same point by reduction to impossible: ~~Materialis~~

~~Materialis~~ Materia appetit formam ut bonum: qd est desiderare ipsam secundum suam naturam, i.e. Phantasiam.

But if privation is the same as matter, and since it is opposed to form, the desire would be for the contrary, unde for its own destruction.

Arist. shows this by pointing out that if matter desires form, it does not desire the form which it has. 'Appetitus' here understood as desiderium, which is 'non habiti'.

Then, 'Similiter...' A difficulty. This resolved by fact that the 'appetitus' for another form is that of the matter, not of the privation: although the former would not be without the latter; still, it is not the privation that is the 'appetitus'.

If it were, 'aliquid appetit sui corruptionem?' (4)

Then, Avicenna's objection, noted by S.Th., n. 8.

Avic. gives three reasons against Arist.'s position:

① This appetite is neither 'animalis', as is obvious, nor natural, since matter has no form which would incline it to something. For, in both cases, 'appetitus sequitur formam'?

② If matter desires form, this would be
- either because it has no form at all;
- or because it desires to have them all at once; either case ~~is~~ is impossible;
- or because it has enough of the form which it is actually subject to, which is in vain, since the same would obtain of any form.

③ 'Female desires male', applied to matter and form is poetic metaphor, not a phil. way of speaking.

S.Th. replies (n. 10): Easy!

Whatever desires something,

- either knows this something and orders itself to it;
- or tends toward it qua ordered and directed by a knower - 'ut sapienter'.

Natural appetite ~~is not~~ is nothing but the ordination things to their end, in conformity with their own nature. Now, ~~it is not only~~ it is not only what is in act that is ordered toward an end by virtue of its action, but matter, too, is so ordered, inasmuch as it is in potency: form being the final cause of matter - not just a result?

Hence, to say that matter desires form, simply
means that it is ordered to form as potency
to act. Potency is 'ordo ad actum', and
the act in question is existential, hence, good:
bonum ex se in rebus.

N.B. In all potency there is a pre-ordered similitude
of the act of which it is the potency: the potency is
'in the sake of' the act. Otherwise indifference of
potency to act. The animal appetite is 'ad a quo
nomen appetitus naturalis imponitur'. (Change of
imposition here, as in 'the intellectus is a natural
appetite'; whereas the one which it has is the will.)
This proportion of potency to act is also called
'coaptatio'. Hence 'Similitudo ad causam amoris'.

The desideratum is in the desiderans by this
similitude, and by reason of which the latter
is weighted to the former. The desideratum is
in the desiderans 'per modum ponderis'. Not
necessarily intentionally or objectively, except by reason
of a knower. [Relatively, maxima similit. with God.]

Error of Leibniz:
monads contain all
universe intentionally.

The desire of matter is not something other
than matter itself. Not an action. Q. D. de Pot. IV, 1, 2^a & 3^a.
See how St. Thomas uses this doctrine, Q. 9. II, 22; de Ver. 22, 1, 3^a.

Now, "Et quia sub quacunque forma sit..." (Sq. 9. 11)
Nor is it a metaphorical way of speaking, sed exemplari.
But it can be taken as a metaphor, which it was in Plato.

n. 4. P. Th's expl. of the 'in eo'.

Cf. Meta. 6, n. 1389
8, 1442

de celo I, l. 3, n. 4

QG. III, c. 23

de Ver. 24, a. 1, c.: "moveretur seipsa, non a seipsa"

Circa hoc duo: (a) gravit. does not call for an agent pushing things around. If the mass of A is x , and of B, $x+y$, A will be attracted, etc. We attribute this to nature, but not to a pusher, not to an active principle, except remotely, i.e. to the *primum generans*. Phys. VIII, 8, n.
(b) Evolution. Cf. II 23. - Combine with Phys. I, l. 15.

n. 5. Concludit definitionem - not 'naturam'.

(a) quare 'principium'.

(b) quare 'principium et causa'.

(c) quare 'moverendi et "quiescendi"'

(d) quare 'in quo est', ^{primum:} Compar. 'natura et anima':
de Ver. 24, a. 1, c.; de An. II 3, 257; 7, 312.

(e) 'per se et non secundum accidens'.

~~If the faculty of feeling~~
the ill, it would be nature, not art.

Reliqua sunt manifesta.

First part proceeds inductively. Follows the order of learning. Attends to the way we name causes.

Second part (n. 8) reduces all those causes to four kinds. Emphasis on final cause. Note that the metaph. study of nature abstracts from finality and therefore from action for an end.

Phys. II, lect. 6.

These modes are taken from the various ways in which causes and effects are related.

A. Causes related to effects: division
 1^a on any given species of cause, one may be prior to another by reason of greater generality. Art → Medicine
 This is case of efficient cause. But, health
 art as in the intellect, and medicine,
 related as final causes. . .
 Astrology } common to practical sciences: being
 causative: God

2a (n. 4)

Causa per se } per accidens, divided as per se;
 " per accidens }
 More or less general. } Polyletus
 Per accidens causes of nature } homo
 Per se Polyletus causes } animal

Some accidental causes are more potent per se cause than others. Notice definition of accid. cause.

3a { causas in potentia } Modes of cause.
 causas in actu.


B. Effects related to causes.

This statue, statue, image.

Applies to accidental effects. Notice definition of acc. effect.

4^a divisio. Per se and per accidens causes are sometimes taken together. (Notice "ut si non dicamus..."): Polychronism known factors.

∴ All these modes reduce to a certain number.



Three consequences:

1^o Proper causes in act are simultaneous with their effects. "This builder building this house." "Plumber singularis." Only true of stone. Note: "unde habetur..." God is "causa extrinseca in actu". If He withdraws, things would lapse into nothingness.

2^o The more common effect requires a cause that is more universal in causes. But such as cause is not cause only of what is most common but also of what is proper.

3^o We must, in natural things, seek not the "supreme cause," the "prima". Comparison with art. Hence, to say that the elephant's trunk because God made them so is not sufficient.

3^o ~~Causes must be~~

Effects must be proportionally related to their effects.

General effects to general causes; particular effects to particular causes. (See text, n. 11)

Phys. II, text 7.

: Obsolete causes.

Fortune and chance. Why both here?

The ancients did not treat of these. Strange:

if they believed that they are causes they should have treated of them. If they did not, they should not have resorted to such

causes as distinct from others. This is what Empedocles did. He extended chance to the formation of natural species.

Aristotle: the heavens and the whole world uncreated by chance, but not this world of nature.
 ~~by the elements.~~

Third opinion: Fortune a divine cause.

"Non bene visi sunt nomine fortunae".

Fortune is essentially an inferior cause.

Phys. II, l. 8.

Definition: divisions:

1^a Sempiterna: all animals die.

perpetua: man born with spirit

last part: " " third.

2^a ~~Quidam~~ perpetua ~~perpetua~~ } either because not per-
" " non. }

Schemas de conférences - (en anglais)

Thèmes: Incarnation
St. Thomas
autorité de l'Église
Révélation

1. Revel. & natural truth.
2. Incarn. Word came to instruct us:
Principium, qui et loquor vobis
3. Teaching & divine government.
4. Incarn. & teaching authority of
the Church: norm: essential
reality: Vicar of Christ.
5. Auth. extends to phil. ut ancilla theologiae.
6. St Thomas has been proposed
as Doctor Communis - -- John 22...
7. Believing St. Thomas, and understanding.
8. Does this limit our freedom?
Contingency & act of knowledge.
Importance of early formation.
Influence
to posterity
To whom shall we go?
Thanks to Auth. we know where.
9. Difference between { theol. sc.
spirituality.
10. O.P.S.

1. Div. revel. extends to strictly supernatural truths, but also to natural truths. Why the latter?
2. God Himself instructs us, not only by means of the prophets ~~past~~ who spoke in His name; He Himself, in the person of the Word Incarnate.
 "In quis es? ... Principium, qui et loquor vobis."
 God in His humanity norm of faith: a visible, sensible, tangible norm...
 Taught us in our own mode.
3. Teaching ~~and divine government~~ authority of the Church & perfection of the Incarnation.
 This auth. extends even to the ancilla theologian.
4. Teaching and divine government by subordinate causes.
5. Because so much of what we know comes to us from others by instruction, the teacher makes all the difference, even in the purely natural sciences; especially in philosophy.
6. For centuries the Church has led us to St. Thomas as the Master par excellence. His teaching has been proposed by the Church as the norm of the truths that can be found elsewhere.
 Acceptit eam in suam.
7. Does this mean that a Catholic anxious to follow the directives, takes philosophy on faith?

distinction between belief and understanding;
between believing that St. is right, and seeing
that he is.

8. Does this not limit our freedom? Why should we
not be left to choose our master, as we do
in the mathematical and experimental sciences?
Note the endless conflicts between philosophers.
If philosophy is nevertheless an indispensable
instrument (ancilla) of theology, it must
be the true one; and it must be possible to
come to know its truth in a philosophical way.

9. Contingency in the acquisition of learning.

Importance of early formation.

Attractibility of the child's mind.

Repetition. Frequent identification
of what happens often with reason for
~~what happens~~ what happens often.

If so much depends on the master
we begin to learn from, to which
master shall we turn?

Is there any advantage in being
left to chance, to one's own choice
and risk?

College of
Mount St. Joseph-On-The-Ohio
Mount St. Joseph, O.

1. Our natural mode of knowing: from sensible things.
All other knowledge depends upon senses: ~~from sensible things~~
2. Teaching by means of words & symbols: sensible.
Words specially important in naming supra-sensible things, by extending their meaning. E.g., 'to see', 'light'.
(for the purpose of instruction concerning our end. This act for this end as rational...)
3. Revelation was made by means of sensible words. We must.
Words - concepts - things.
Supernatural truths are naturally known only to God.
He alone can name them.
This requires new impositions: V.g. 'Saviour', 'Immaculate Conception'. Imposed by the Holy Ghost.
Not without reference to prior impositions.
4. Revealing Himself, and his designs, by means of the Prophets, God makes us know the supernatural truths in a way that is proportioned to our nature. However, the things thus named, and expressed in propositions, are known to us only as objects of faith. For no man hath seen God at any time (Jo, i. 18). The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee (Isa. 64.4).

Yet, we must have some knowledge of the end and of the proper means of tending towards that end.

It is faith that fulfils this condition. For faith is "the substance of things that are hoped for, and the conviction of things unseen." (Hebr. 11.1).

5. Disting. : ^{believe,} the certitude of the object ~~to which we adhere~~
 the firmness with which we adhere to it.

Faith is said of the object : the primary truth itself, which we know ex auditu.
 the quality of our assent to it. This certitude admits of degrees, according as it is conveyed to us in a manner more proportioned to our nature and to our life as wayfarers.

6. In the Old Testament : the prophets, persons seen and heard, and tangible. They spoke, in the name of God, in a way proportioned to our rational nature. But they did not possess the truth of themselves. Their persons and their sayings were instruments. In them God merely prepared the way for the birth and life amongst, in our mode, of Him ~~who is Truth itself, and~~ who would testify to the ~~the~~ truth which is His own name.

Because of the Incarnation, the very Person of the Son, of the Word, instructed us, in His human nature, by the words, the sensible signs, which are the usual means of communication amongst men. For Christ was "that which we have heard ..., which we have looked upon, and touched with our hands." (I Jo. 1.1).

THE ATHENAEUM OF OHIO
Mount Saint Mary's Seminary of the West
5440 MOELLER AVENUE
NORWOOD 12, OHIO

1. Perfection of Incarn. and visible sensible norm of faith.
We were instructed by the word Himself.

1. Our natural mode of knowing: from sensible things.
We remain dependent upon them: Logic, Mathem.,
Metaph. - ...
2. Sensible words & symbols essential to all human teaching. - How words, sensible signs, are used to signify supra-sensible things! by extended meanings, viz. new impositions. E.g. 'To see', 'light'.
(Words, concepts, things.)
3. God has chosen that our ultimate should be to know, and to love Him, as He is in Himself. Only the rational creature can be raised to this end. If the rational creature is to act for this end as a rational creature, it must know this end somehow. Hence (cf. Ia, p. 1, a. 1) the hypothetical necessity of revelation, by God, Who, alone, by His nature, knows that truth.
4. Instruction by infused knowledge. Such resembles more the mode of knowing that is connatural to the angels.
We learn from things and from teachers, ^{ex auditu.} The latter depends upon ^{sensible} words and symbols. If God wishes to proportion the mode of communication to our natural mode of learning, he must, on this hypothesis, do so by using words.
What words? We name things as we know them. But God alone knows the supernatural things and words: He alone can name them. Nemo dum vidit unquam. The eye hath not seen, O God, the

things than had prepared for them that wait for ^{St. Meinrad, Indiana} ~~thee~~.
Hence new impositions. E.g. 'Partum', 'Immaculate
Conception'. Not without reference to prior impositions.

5. God did speak to us through the voice of the Prophets:
There were persons visible to the eye, and tangible. In
so doing, God proportioned his revelation to our mode
of learning. Yet, while the prophets spoke in the
name of God..... Their persons, ~~and~~ their concepts
and words were mere instruments (separate), ^{preparing}
the way for Him who was to come to us in His
own Person by way of birth, to instruct us here
and to testify to the truth that He is in His own
person.

hic p. 5.

Schemas de conférences

Ces documents étaient dans la chemise (Hémisphère Vesp. États-Unis - 1955)

Il s'agit de 5 schemas de conférences.

L'un est daté de 1957 : - "The Imm. Conc. and the Doctrine of Coredeception"

3

Not a hair
falls...

(iii): Common Nuts, corn & bean of a meal.

For buying the articles of stores taken in course of road.

COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS
WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

'Existence is prior to nature' or 'Man has no nature'.

Inconstancy and precariousness of the indiv. man.

His existence is historical.

Mainly one of care or concern, and dread, on verge of nothingness:
like a moment in non-being - and its inevitable issue
in death.

Uncertainty as to ~~know~~ what we are in the eyes of God. Nec numerus
judicio.

The gap between things as they are and things as they should be.

Scientific knowledge of human existence impossible - no sc. of the
indiv. nor of the eschizont. But the existence that we are
concerned with is that of the indiv. man.

(a) that Socrates exists.

(b) the kind of existent that he is: its individuality ^{inapplicable to} science.

(c) his existence seen in its causes.

(d) " " as measured by time: - + -

(f) his existence is as a potential ^{or} actual contradiction: while
he is he can not be. While he is, he ~~approaches~~ ^{is} ~~on the~~ ^{the} verge of nothingness.

The Imm. Concept, and the Archetype of Christhood
Purpose of Incarn. (de facto): man's self-redemption.
Causa sui.

8 Dec. 1954 Explicitly: by divine Person in human nature.

By coop. of human person in work
of Univ. Redemption.

Mary, one with Christ, in Univ. way.

① In order of nature: in assimilation
of generation: God the Son proceeds
as image of Mary.
Grace of union, grace of personality.
Euharistic order.

Natural basis of friendship between
divine Person and human person.
Natural basis of participation in
X's Person. Principal communion

② In the order of grace:
X's habitual grace follows grace of union
'as a natural property' hence place
of hypostatic order.
Mary's grace proportioned to motherhood:
'dignum habitudinem generantis':
connatural.
Union of grace most intimate. Perfect,
with respect to life proper to Godhead,
natural union of Mother & Son.
Both their habitual grace 'personal';
in other redundant? Both universal
causes.

Only Godhead principal cause of grace. ②
X's humanity only instrumental, but
rational and free. Godhead not instr.
cause. But person of Mary instrumental
cause.

Both Person, humanity, and Mary, univ.
causes.

Quid univ. cause? One → many, simul.

: Principal and instrumental attain same effect.

Difficulty: The mediator, The offering.

As to grace: X as much as can be had

As " " his role requires.

Ex gratia: { praeservativ. } both from X.
 { reparativ. }

Mary, "sublimiori modo edempta?"

Applic. of univ. causal.

Univ. cause not divided by multip. eff.

God causa totius orbis

Angels, natural, univ. cause, inst.

God in ed. cause univers.

Cp III 70.

X's humanity univ. inst. cause: proper
effect: praeserv. & reparativ.

Mary dependent on X, → reparativ.

Gen. 2: Bonum diffus. sui. (Cf. Galley)

Epit.: Nobility of friendship.

Ethics, IX, 8, 1169a15

Hence greater friendship for us.

The **BILTMORE** MADISON AVENUE AT 43RD STREET, NEW YORK 17
The EXECUTIVE Hotel of New York

- Raises some very old questions - calling to mind Job & Ecclesiastes.
The things that are not of our choosing:
Existence. No choice. Besides, largely due to chance. No such essence
in nature. Chance meeting.
Kind of person we are.
• Characteristic notes: physical and mental, with us per se.
• Time, place.
• Human milieu: parents; their fortune; social milieu.
Education.
Our place. Uncertainty of our days, brevity of death, Natural, yet.
Contingency. Testing on edge of nothingness.
- Our objective being { in mind & feel
of angels
in ourselves
in mind of neighbor. Usually we live for this "true sense in
opinion hominem."
- Actually, strangers to one another { to neighbor
to selves too.
- Christian reply: Faith - in God's Providence: our nature & contingency.
Elaborate { Hope - in His goodness: uncertainty regarding what now and then
not.... { Charity - by which we are as we should be. Measure of future
blessedness
- Means to this: Render service to God - Religion. Freely elections. Not
sheer resignation, but active will. It's passion.
- No other final answer: Love God & neighbor.

In view of this, the distinction between geometry and arithmetic could be defined as 'when one fails to see that they should really ^{be} the same'. That geometry is worthless unless it can have the rigour of arithmetic which is not really rigorous either.

If we assume that the continuum is as rational as the discrete, plainly geometry cannot have the rigour of arithmetic.

all numbers have the
same question mark.

11

The definition of circle allows for any number of individual circles. But the individual circle we actually consider is like the man Socrates we actually consider. The universal 'man' does not actually contain 'all men'....

Nothing particularly
interesting about this
circle except inasmuch as
I am not using it to
demonstrate

This individual cannot be 'like' 'man' in the sense that he is like to that other individual. This circle is not like circle as it is like to that other circle. To define a thing, like the number two, by the likeness of examples..... kind of strange.

Similia 'one in quality'.

Aequalia 'one in quantity'.